Serendipity has a Host Header Injection allows authentication cookie scoping to attacker-controlled domain in functions_config.inc.php
Summary
The serendipity_setCookie() function uses $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] without validation as the domain parameter of setcookie(). An attacker can force authentication cookies — including session tokens and auto-login tokens — to be scoped to an attacker-controlled domain, facilitating session hijacking.
Details
In include/functions_config.inc.php:726:
function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, $securebyprot = true, ...) {
$host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; // ← attacker-controlled, no validation
if ($securebyprot) {
if ($pos = strpos($host, ":")) {
$host = substr($host, 0, $pos); // strips port only
}
}
setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
'domain' => $host, // ← poisoned domain
'httponly' => $httpOnly,
'samesite' => 'Strict'
]);
}
This function is called during login with sensitive cookies:
// functions_config.inc.php:455-498
serendipity_setCookie('author_autologintoken', $rnd, true, false, true);
serendipity_setCookie('author_username', $user);
serendipity_setCookie('author_token', $hash);
If an attacker can influence the Host header at login time (e.g. via MITM, reverse proxy misconfiguration, or load balancer), authentication cookies are issued scoped to the attacker's domain instead of the legitimate one.
PoC
curl -v -X POST \
-H "Host: attacker.com" \
-d "serendipity[user]=admin&serendipity[pass]=admin" \
http://[TARGET]/serendipity_admin.php 2>&1 | grep -i "set-cookie"
Expected output:
Set-Cookie: serendipity[author_token]=; domain=attacker.com; HttpOnly
Impact
- Session fixation — attacker pre-sets a cookie scoped to their domain, then tricks the victim into authenticating, inheriting the poisoned token
- Token leakage —
author_autologintokenscoped to wrong domain may be sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure - Privilege escalation — if admin logs in under a poisoned Host header, their admin token is compromised
Suggested Fix
Validate HTTP_HOST against the configured $serendipity['url'] before use:
function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, ...) {
global $serendipity;
$configured = parse_url($serendipity['url'], PHP_URL_HOST);
$host = preg_replace('/:[0-9]+$/', '', $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']);
$host = ($host === $configured) ? $host : $configured;
setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
'domain' => $host,
...
]);
}
Affected software
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| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Composer package | s9y/serendipity | < 2.6.0 | 2.6.0 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-565- Platform
- Composer
- Package
s9y/serendipity- Disclosed
- 14.04.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: s9y/serendipity
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Composer package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 2
- First → latest
- 04.2026 04.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- High 1
- Medium 1
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 2
-
Serendipity has a Host Header Injection allows authentication cookie scoping to attacker-controlled domain in functions_config.inc.php this entry
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