Serendipity has a Host Header Injection allows authentication cookie scoping to attacker-controlled domain in functions_config.inc.php
Summary
The serendipity_setCookie() function uses $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] without validation as the domain parameter of setcookie(). An attacker can force authentication cookies — including session tokens and auto-login tokens — to be scoped to an attacker-controlled domain, facilitating session hijacking.
Details
In include/functions_config.inc.php:726:
function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, $securebyprot = true, ...) {
$host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; // ← attacker-controlled, no validation
if ($securebyprot) {
if ($pos = strpos($host, ":")) {
$host = substr($host, 0, $pos); // strips port only
}
}
setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
'domain' => $host, // ← poisoned domain
'httponly' => $httpOnly,
'samesite' => 'Strict'
]);
}
This function is called during login with sensitive cookies:
// functions_config.inc.php:455-498
serendipity_setCookie('author_autologintoken', $rnd, true, false, true);
serendipity_setCookie('author_username', $user);
serendipity_setCookie('author_token', $hash);
If an attacker can influence the Host header at login time (e.g. via MITM, reverse proxy misconfiguration, or load balancer), authentication cookies are issued scoped to the attacker's domain instead of the legitimate one.
PoC
curl -v -X POST \
-H "Host: attacker.com" \
-d "serendipity[user]=admin&serendipity[pass]=admin" \
http://[TARGET]/serendipity_admin.php 2>&1 | grep -i "set-cookie"
Expected output:
Set-Cookie: serendipity[author_token]=; domain=attacker.com; HttpOnly
Impact
- Session fixation — attacker pre-sets a cookie scoped to their domain, then tricks the victim into authenticating, inheriting the poisoned token
- Token leakage —
author_autologintokenscoped to wrong domain may be sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure - Privilege escalation — if admin logs in under a poisoned Host header, their admin token is compromised
Suggested Fix
Validate HTTP_HOST against the configured $serendipity['url'] before use:
function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, ...) {
global $serendipity;
$configured = parse_url($serendipity['url'], PHP_URL_HOST);
$host = preg_replace('/:[0-9]+$/', '', $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']);
$host = ($host === $configured) ? $host : $configured;
setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
'domain' => $host,
...
]);
}
Software afectado
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| Plataforma | Paquete | Versiones vulnerables | Corregida en |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paquete de Composer | s9y/serendipity | < 2.6.0 | 2.6.0 |
Referencias
- Vector CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N- Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-565- Plataforma
- Composer
- Paquete
s9y/serendipity- Publicada
- 14.04.2026
- Actualizado
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Fuentes y licencias
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf - CC BY 4.0
Historial de vulnerabilidades: s9y/serendipity
Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Paquete de Composer), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.
- Entradas en total
- 2
- Primera → última
- 04.2026 04.2026
- Sin corrección
- 0
- Explotada en ataques
- 0
Distribución por gravedad
- Alta 1
- Media 1
Divulgaciones por año
- 2026: 2
-
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