Medium

mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch

  • Disclosed: 16.11.2026
  • Updated: 17.11.2026 01:17

Impact

write_attachments() called _safe_attachment_filename() and write_sample() inside its loop with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment after the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that catches only MailParserError.

That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client intact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496.

Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:

  • NUL smuggled through RFC 2231 — filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin decodes to a NUL in the filename during parsing and raised ValueError out of the name check;
  • overlong basename — a filename longer than NAME_MAX (e.g. 300 characters) raised OSError: File name too long from open(), after creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
  • undecodable payload — a body that is not valid base64 raised binascii.Error (a ValueError subclass) from the decode performed inside the open() block.
python
import tempfile, mailparser

raw = ("Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n"
       "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
       "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\r\n\r\nxx\r\n"
       "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
       "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\r\n\r\nyy\r\n"
       "--b--\r\n")

mp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw)     # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None
mp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())
# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 -> ValueError, and good.bin is never written
# 4.6.3         -> logs "Skipped attachment with invalid filename: 'evil\x00.bin'";
#                  good.bin is written

parse() itself was never affected — it catches the ValueError — so only the write path was unguarded. The reject-paths that made this reachable were introduced with the filename sanitizing in 4.6.0 (PR #165).

Patches

Fixed in 4.6.3. write_attachments() now logs and skips a single unusable attachment instead of aborting the batch:

  • an invalid filename is caught and skipped;
  • overlong basenames are truncated to 240 UTF-8 bytes, preserving the extension, rather than reaching open();
  • the base64 decode moved before open(), so a failure leaves no zero-byte stub, and it now repairs padding and alphabet errors the way mail clients do (matching MIME::Base64 on 2008 cases) — rejecting them let a sender append one character to make an attachment vanish from the extraction directory while it still reached the recipient;
  • MailParserPathError is deliberately not caught by the per-attachment handler: a containment failure is not a per-attachment problem, and path-containment checks now raise MailParserPathError instead of ValueError so the broader catch cannot swallow them.

Deduplication was hardened in the same change: it reserves room for its own suffix marker (write_sample() sanitizes again, and the clamp there used to cut the marker back off, collapsing distinct attachments onto one file), resumes from the last used suffix per stem instead of rescanning from 1 (quadratic before — 16000 same-named attachments took 14 s, now milliseconds), and folds case, because APFS, exFAT and SMB collapse Invoice.pdf and invoice.pdf.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 4.6.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not call write_attachments() on untrusted mail; iterate parser.attachments yourself and write each attachment inside its own try/except Exception, skipping the ones whose safe_filename is None.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Python (PyPI) mail-parser >= 4.6.0, < 4.6.3 4.6.3

References

CVSS score 6.5/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-248, CWE-436
Platform
Python (PyPI)
Package
mail-parser
Disclosed
16.11.2026
Updated
17.11.2026 01:17

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: mail-parser

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

Total entries
6
First → latest
11.2026 11.2026
Without a fix
0
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • High 2
  • Medium 4

Disclosures per year

  1. 2026: 6
  1. mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch this entry
    Medium · 6.5 CVE-2026-129301 >= 4.6.0, < 4.6.3 4.6.3
  2. Medium · 5.3 CVE-2026-129300 >= 3.7.0, < 4.6.3 4.6.3
  3. High · 7.5 CVE-2026-129297 < 4.6.2 4.6.2
  4. High · 7.5 CVE-2026-129295 >= 4.2.0, < 4.6.1 4.6.1
  5. Medium · 6.5 CVE-2026-129296 >= 3.8.0, < 4.6.0 4.6.0

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