mail-parser is vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS in email header parsing
Summary
Two regular expressions used while parsing email headers backtrack polynomially on attacker-controlled input. Parsing a single small, well-formed email can consume minutes to hours of CPU, denying service to any process that parses untrusted mail.
Both are reachable from an ordinary parse_from_string(), parse_from_bytes(), or parse_from_file() call — no special API, option, or malformed structure is required by the victim.
Details
1. Address-header fallback regex (src/mailparser/utils.py)
get_addresses() falls back to _ADDR_FALLBACK_RE whenever email.utils.getaddresses(strict=True) yields no usable address. The alternative ([^<,]*?)\s*<([^>]+)> overlaps a lazy quantifier with an adjacent \s* — a space matches both. Driven by finditer, which retries at every offset and rescans the remainder, matching degrades to quadratic on < padding and cubic on whitespace padding.
The fallback engages on the feature's own happy path, e.g. From: alice@example.com <bob@example.com>.
Measured (4.6.0, CPython 3.14, macOS arm64; reproduced identically on Linux and on CPython 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13):
| Padding | Parse time |
|---|---|
| valid address + 750 sp | 0.38 s |
| + 1500 sp | 2.97 s |
| + 3000 sp | 23.4 s (×7.9/2×) |
| + 6 KB sp | 185 s |
| ~100 KB sp | hours |
Fully RFC 5322-compliant folded headers (all lines ≤ 71 octets) trigger the same blowup, so the input passes normal MTA and library checks. ~100 KB of headers is within Postfix's default header_size_limit = 102400.
All six address headers parsed by the library (From, To, Cc, Bcc, Reply-To, Delivered-To) are affected and their cost adds up linearly.
2. Received-header clause splitter (src/mailparser/const.py)
parse_received() splits on _CLAUSE_SPLITTER, (?:^|\s+)(from|by|via|with|id|for|envelope-from)\s+. Under re.split this backtracks quadratically over any whitespace run that is not followed by a clause keyword. The pre-existing normalization collapsed only [\t\n], so literal spaces — including folded-header padding — reached the splitter intact.
Measured: 24 000 spaces in one Received: header → 22 s; ~100 KB → minutes.
Impact
Availability. A handful of small emails keeps every parsing worker of a mail gateway, ticketing system, quarantine UI, or archiving pipeline permanently busy. No confidentiality or integrity impact.
Anyone who parses email they did not author is affected — which is the library's purpose.
Patches
Fixed in 4.6.1.
- The address fallback is now a linear scan: the header is split into comma-separated items (quote-aware, in Python), then each item is matched against a bounded angle-address
<([^<>\s]+)>with the display name derived in Python, falling back to a bare-email match. Each pattern has a single non-nested quantifier over a negated character class → O(n). 2000 padding spaces:3.5 s → <0.01 s. 256 KB padding:hours → 0.087 s. Output is preserved on every previously supported shape. parse_received()collapses whitespace runs to a single space before splitting, so the splitter's\s+only ever matches one character → O(n). The date is extracted from the raw header beforehand, so date formatting is unaffected. 24 000 spaces:22 s → 0.003 s; 200 000 spaces:0.004 s.
Regression tests assert linear-time behaviour for both paths.
Workarounds
None within the library. Upgrade to 4.6.1.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should cap total header size before parsing and enforce a wall-clock timeout around each parse.
What to do
Upgrade to 4.6.1. If upgrading immediately is not possible, cap total email header size prior to parsing and enforce a wall-clock timeout around each parse call.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | mail-parser | >= 4.2.0, < 4.6.1 | 4.6.1 |
References
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129295
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/166
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/037293158cb291caa96635a54449243d32cd4d96
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/5aab122f0d763991604d2c2bcc807c6bf2489464
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/85e53f820d78ae7c955dafbbcd0e20989a735c2c
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser
- https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.1
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-1333- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
mail-parser- Disclosed
- 16.11.2026
- Updated
- 17.11.2026 10:00
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: mail-parser
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 6
- First → latest
- 11.2026 11.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- High 2
- Medium 4
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 6
-
mail-parser is vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS in email header parsing this entry
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