iSponsorBlockTV: SSRF via Malicious SSDP Response Spoofing in Local Device Discovery
Summary
iSponsorBlockTV discovers local smart TV devices via SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol). The LOCATION URL from SSDP responses is used to fetch device capabilities without URL validation. A local network attacker can craft a malicious SSDP response with a LOCATION pointing to any internal HTTP service, causing SSRF when the application fetches device information.
Details
In src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py:92-96, upon receiving an SSDP M-SEARCH response, the code extracts the LOCATION header and makes an HTTP GET request to that URL to retrieve DIAL device description XML. The URL is not validated against expected device IP ranges, expected schemes, or private/internal IP blocklists. Any device on the LAN (or a rogue WiFi access point) can respond to SSDP M-SEARCH queries with a LOCATION pointing to internal services.
Impact
Blind SSRF against internal network services; access to home router admin interfaces, smart home controllers, NAS admin pages, and other local services; potential credential disclosure from fetched responses. It'd be able to either:
- show a debug log line
- __main__ - DEBUG - Discovered device at <attacker controlled URL>, processing...(which is normally disabled and won't be shown in the actual configurator since textual doesn't show logs unless running in dev mode and launching a second terminal to inspect log output), and make a single GET request to an "attacker controlled" url which does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server) (dial_client.pyL131-L133) - make single POST request to a partly "attacker controlled" url since it'll always have the suffix
/YouTubeappended (dial_client.pyL139) , with predefined headers{"Origin": "https://www.youtube.com","Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",}(dial_client.pyL158-L161) and a predefined payload{"pairingCode": <random 12 digit code>, "theme": "cl"}which also does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server with a YouTube app running on it) (dial_client.pyL162)
Fix
Validate SSDP LOCATION URLs: allow only http{s}:// scheme, extract the IP address, and verify it matches the SSDP sender's IP address. Reject LOCATION values pointing to private IP ranges other than the expected device subnet. (Done on v2.11.0)
Betroffene Software
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| Plattform | Paket | Anfällige Versionen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | isponsorblocktv | < 2.11.0 | 2.11.0 |
Verweise
- https://github.com/dmunozv04/iSponsorBlockTV/security/advisories/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77597
- https://github.com/dmunozv04/iSponsorBlockTV/commit/7d315115f41523632588fb0b22d46d85807172b7
- https://github.com/dmunozv04/iSponsorBlockTV
- https://github.com/dmunozv04/iSponsorBlockTV/releases/tag/v2.11.0
- CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N- Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-918- Plattform
- Python (PyPI)
- Paket
isponsorblocktv- Veröffentlicht
- 19.11.2026
- Aktualisiert
- 19.11.2026 22:17
Quellen und Lizenzen
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m - CC BY 4.0
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