OpenClaw: Sandboxed /acp spawn requests could initialize host ACP sessions

Summary

Sandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through /acp spawn.

OpenClaw already blocked sessions_spawn({ runtime: "acp" }) from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.

Affected Packages / Versions

• npm package: openclaw
• Affected versions: <= 2026.3.2
• Patched version: >= 2026.3.7

Details

ACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in src/agents/acp-spawn.ts already denied sandboxed requesters, but /acp spawn in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts called initializeSession(...) without first applying the same restriction.

In affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use /acp spawn to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.

Fix Commit(s)

• 61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3

Fix Details

The fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in src/agents/acp-spawn.ts and reused it from the /acp spawn handler in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts to prove sandboxed /acp spawn requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.

Release Process Note

Patched version is pre-set to 2026.3.7 so the advisory can be published once that npm release is available.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.