OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback

Vulnerability

In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.

In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account webhookSecret when only the account-level secret was configured.

Typical Use Case Context

Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.

Impact

• Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.
• Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.
• Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: npm openclaw
• Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
• Patched version: 2026.2.15 (planned next release)

Remediation

• Add and enforce tools.sessions.visibility (self | tree | agent | all) across session tools, defaulting to tree.
• Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.
• Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.

Fix Commit(s)

• c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.