djust: Client mass-assignment of arbitrary view attributes via the default dj-model update_model handler
Impact
djust.mixins.model_binding.ModelBindingMixin provides a default update_model event handler and is part of the LiveView base MRO, so every LiveView exposes it. It setattrs a view attribute whose name is client-supplied (field), gated only by: reject _-prefixed names; reject a 14-entry denylist of framework internals (FORBIDDEN_MODEL_FIELDS); optional allowed_model_fields which defaults to None = allow all; and hasattr existence.
Result: a client can set any public, existing view attribute — not just the fields actually bound with dj-model= in the rendered template. The denylist covers framework plumbing but nothing about developer business/authz state, and the allowlist is opt-in (off by default). A developer who binds one dj-model="search" input and also keeps self.account_id / self.is_admin / self.total_price as view state does not realize a client can set ALL of them via {type:event, event:"update_model", params:{field, value}} over the WebSocket. Type coercion matches the target attribute's type (so "true" -> bool True), aiding the attacker.
Severity High for apps that hold authorization/ownership/business state in public view attributes (the normal djust pattern) -> state tampering / IDOR / authz-flag manipulation; Low otherwise. Default-on across every LiveView. For a public (no-login) view an anonymous client can mass-assign; for an authenticated view a logged-in user can tamper their own session's view state (the IDOR/authz vector when downstream handlers act on it without re-authorizing).
Reproduced: a view with account_id/is_admin/total_price (none bound with dj-model) had all three set via update_model calls.
Patches
Restrict the default handler to fields actually exposed via dj-model=: have the template renderer record the bound-field set per render and reject any field outside it (preferred, secure + zero-config); or make allowed_model_fields fail-closed (required). Keep FORBIDDEN_MODEL_FIELDS only as defense-in-depth. Add a regression that a non-dj-model public attribute (e.g. is_admin) is rejected while a bound field still updates.
Workarounds
Set allowed_model_fields explicitly on every view using dj-model (or subclassing LiveView) to the minimal list of bindable fields; do not keep authorization/ownership state in public view attributes that share the view with dj-model bindings.
References
Reproducer + finding writeup retained privately by the maintainer.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | djust | < 1.0.7 | 1.0.7 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-915- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
djust- Disclosed
- 16.09.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 15:18
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-4042 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-cc7c-9jff-58wj - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: djust
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 15
- First → latest
- 08.2026 09.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 1
- High 11
- Medium 3
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 15
-
djust: Client mass-assignment of arbitrary view attributes via the default dj-model update_model handler this entry
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