java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor
Summary
When directConnect(true) is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally
accepts directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath
from the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent
session traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist,
no host validation, and no user notification.
Affected Code
AppiumCommandExecutor.java(line 196–219):setDirectConnect()builds a new URL from server-supplied fields and callsoverrideServerUrl(newUrl)without validating host/IP.DirectConnect.java:getUrl()constructsprotocol://host:port/pathwith no allowlist.
Root Cause
Only the protocol is validated (must equal "https"). The destination host and port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist.
PoC (confirmed)
A rogue server injecting directConnectHost=127.0.0.1:4443 causes the
client to silently redirect all post-session commands:
[bootstrap] POST /wd/hub/session [bootstrap] Injecting directConnect -> https://127.0.0.1:4443/wd/hub [redirect-target] HIT #1: GET /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001/source [redirect-target] HIT #2: DELETE /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001
Original source code unmodified — confirmed via git diff HEAD (empty).
Evidence Screenshots
Screenshot 1 — Rogue server capturing redirected traffic:
<img width="887" height="146" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc28002c-ea20-4ac8-8336-cec632e3c842" />Screenshot 2 — Java client processing response from attacker host:
<img width="788" height="130" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/222cbab0-0d53-45b2-847d-6aa4e3b79370" />Impact
- Full interception of session traffic
- Network pivot to internal hosts (RFC-1918, 169.254.169.254)
- Cloud credential theft via IMDS endpoint
- Escalates to ~8.1 High in CI/CD environments where directConnect(true) is set in shared base configuration
Suggested Fix
Add allowlist validation before overrideServerUrl() is called, and/or
block RFC-1918/loopback/link-local destinations by default.
Czego dotyczy
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| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Java / Kotlin (Maven) | io.appium:java-client | >= 8.2.1, < 10.1.1 | 10.1.1 |
Odnośniki
- https://github.com/appium/java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w
- https://github.com/appium/java-client/pull/2408
- https://github.com/appium/java-client/commit/2b9cd442b9dbf56ccc6f1e83aeeb411c0ec230c9
- https://github.com/appium/java-client
- https://github.com/appium/java-client/releases/tag/v10.1.1
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-441, CWE-918- Platforma
- Java / Kotlin (Maven)
- Paczka
io.appium:java-client- Ujawniono
- 28.07.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 12:22
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w - CC BY 4.0
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