High

AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion

  • Disclosed: 30.10.2026
  • Updated: 08.11.2026 10:00

Summary

AdminNeo allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action. The SQLite driver validates file extensions when creating or renaming databases, but the database-list drop path passes submitted db[] values directly to unlink().

Originally reported by @slpoiuewalspoid-dotcom in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-6pg3-chwq-wgqc

Impact

An authenticated AdminNeo SQLite user with a valid CSRF token can submit an arbitrary relative file path in the database-list db[] field. If the PHP process can delete that path, AdminNeo unlinks it even when the file is not a SQLite database.

Root Cause

The database-list page accepts selected database names from the POST body and calls drop_databases():

php
if ($_POST["db"]) {
	queries_redirect(substr(ME, 0, -1), lang('Databases have been dropped.'), drop_databases($_POST["db"]));
}

In SQLite mode, drop_databases() attaches an in-memory database and unlinks each submitted path directly:

php
function drop_databases($databases): bool
{
	Connection::get()->close(); // to unlock file, doesn't work in PDO on Windows
	foreach ($databases as $db) {
		if (!@unlink($db)) {
			Connection::get()->setError(lang('File exists.'));
			return false;
		}
	}
	return true;
}

The same SQLite driver protects create and rename operations with check_sqlite_name(), which requires a .db, .sdb, or .sqlite extension:

php
function check_sqlite_name($name) {
	// avoid creating PHP files on unsecured servers
	$extensions = "db|sdb|sqlite";
	if (!preg_match("~^[^\\0]*\\.($extensions)\$~", $name)) {
		Connection::get()->setError(lang('Please use one of the extensions %s.', str_replace("|", ", ", $extensions)));
		return false;
	}
	return true;
}

The drop path does not apply an equivalent extension check or bind the submitted path to a known listed SQLite database.

POC

1. Start a complete AdminNeo application

Build and start AdminNeo from the audited source using the official standalone Docker image shape. The validation image copies the audited source tree into /var/www/html and starts Nginx HTTP server.

Log in through the SQLite entry point using a SQLite database path poc.sqlite.

2. Prepare a writable target file

Place a non-database file under a location writable by the AdminNeo PHP process. The validation used:

/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txt

The same directory also contained a SQLite database:

/var/www/html/poc.sqlite

3. Submit the database-list drop request

Use the authenticated session and live CSRF token, but submit the non-database path as the selected database:

http
POST /?sqlite=&username= HTTP/1.1
Host: <adminer-host>
Cookie: <authenticated-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

db[]=/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txt&all=&drop=Drop&token=<live-csrf-token>

The request reaches drop_databases($_POST["db"]), and SQLite drop_databases() calls unlink() on the submitted non-database path.

After the request, the poc-delete-target.txt was deleted.

Suggested Fix

Apply the same target validation used by SQLite create/rename before deleting database files. At minimum:

  • Reject paths whose basename does not end in .db, .sdb, or .sqlite.
  • Bind db[] values to databases returned by AdminNeo's database listing instead of trusting submitted paths.
  • Resolve paths before deletion and reject traversal outside the expected SQLite database directory.
  • Consider requiring the current selected database path for delete operations instead of accepting arbitrary submitted file paths.

What to do

Upgrade to version 5.5.1 or later.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Composer package adminneo-org/adminneo < 5.5.1 5.5.1

References

CVSS score 8.1/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-73
Platform
Composer
Package
adminneo-org/adminneo
Disclosed
30.10.2026
Updated
08.11.2026 10:00

Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: adminneo-org/adminneo

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Composer package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

Total entries
6
First → latest
10.2026 10.2026
Without a fix
0
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • High 4
  • Medium 2

Disclosures per year

  1. 2026: 6
  1. AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion this entry
    High · 8.1 CVE-2026-96633 < 5.5.1 5.5.1
  2. High · 7.2 CVE-2026-96630 < 5.5.1 5.5.1

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