High

OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verifying its signature

  • Disclosed: 19.11.2026
  • Updated: 20.11.2026 10:00

Summary

ChainBuilder (the private RFC 5280 validator behind TrustEvaluator and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on Subject Distinguished Name string equality rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor's Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus with no signature verification against the anchor's public key.

An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor's Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.

Impact

A relying party using @openeudi/openid4vp to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a forged credential as genuine, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.

Exploitable through the public verification path: TrustEvaluator.evaluate() returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor's metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.

Details

src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts, tryBuild():

js
while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify & climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain;  // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchor

The signature-verified closure path (if (!issuer) -> verifySignature(current, anchor)) is correct, but the while guard provides a second, unverified exit: when a supplied certificate (the leaf, or an attacker-supplied intermediate) has a Subject DN string equal to the anchor's, the loop body never runs, no verifySignature call is made, and the chain is returned as valid. The per-certificate checks that do run (validity, algorithm, keyUsage) all operate on the attacker-controlled certificate and do not bind it to the anchor.

Secondary contributing weakness (src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts): the anchor selected for the result was matched by serialNumber and fell back to anchors[0] when no match was found, so the forged leaf was reported alongside a genuine anchor's trustedAuthorityIds / provenance.

Proof of Concept

js
// Attacker mints a self-signed cert reusing a trusted anchor's Subject DN.
const impostor = selfSigned({ subject: trustedAnchor.subject /* string */ });
// Vulnerable: resolves to a valid chain [impostor] with no signature check.
await new ChainBuilder().build(impostor, [trustedAnchor]);

Patch

ChainBuilder.tryBuild() now requires the terminating certificate to be byte-identical to the trust anchor (DER rawData comparison) when the loop exits on DN equality; otherwise it throws CertificateChainError with reason: "signature". Cryptographic closure via verifySignature(current, anchor) remains the only other accepted termination. As defense-in-depth, TrustEvaluator now selects the terminating anchor by DER byte-identity and throws instead of silently falling back to the first candidate. Fixed in 0.8.1.

Workarounds

None. Upgrade to 0.8.1.

Credits

Reported by Reza Shokri — Quellkern e.U. (https://augenmass.tech), GitHub @devdotbo. Thanks for the thorough report, the self-contained reproduction, and coordinated disclosure.

What to do

Upgrade to 0.8.1. There are no workarounds.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
npm package @openeudi/openid4vp < 0.8.1 0.8.1

References

CVSS score 7.5/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-295, CWE-347
Platform
npm
Package
@openeudi/openid4vp
Disclosed
19.11.2026
Updated
20.11.2026 10:00

Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: @openeudi/openid4vp

All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

This is the only known vulnerability of this package.

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