High

Mongoose walks into inherited properties when hydrating, setting, and merging, allowing overwrites of built-in functions (denial of service) and shared schema state

  • Disclosed: 10.11.2026
  • Updated: 12.11.2026 10:00

Summary

Three Mongoose code paths copy data into objects by property name without checking whether the property is the object's own or inherited from its prototype:

  1. Loading a document from the database (init(), also used by Model.hydrate())
  2. Setting a dotted path on a document ($__set, used by new Model(obj), doc.set() and doc.$set())
  3. Merging update documents (utils.mergeClone, used by findOneAndReplace(), chained update calls and Query.prototype.merge())

When a key names an inherited property, such as toString or valueOf, or a document internal such as $__schema, Mongoose writes into the shared object behind that property. The data comes from the attacker.

  • Denial of service. For example, { "toString": { "call": 1 } } overwrites Object.prototype.toString.call. Mongoose and most other libraries rely on Object.prototype.toString.call(). After the overwrite, every later query in the process throws TypeError: _toString.call is not a function until the process restarts. This includes queries on unrelated models.
  • Changing shared schema state. Through a subdocument with strict: false, a path such as profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators reaches the subdocument's schema, which every document shares. Setting it to [] removes the required validator for every document in the process.

Mongoose already blocked __proto__, constructor and prototype, so these bugs cannot add properties to Object.prototype itself. They can still overwrite methods and properties of shared built-in functions and of Mongoose's internal objects.

Details

1. Loading documents: init()

js
if (!schemaType && utils.isPOJO(value)) {
  // assume nested object
  if (!doc[i]) { doc[i] = {}; ... }
  init(self, value, doc[i], opts, path + '.');
}

For a stored field named toString, doc[i] is the inherited Object.prototype.toString. It is truthy, so init() recurses into that function and copies the stored subfields onto it.

This runs for every document Mongoose loads: find(), findOne(), cursors, populated documents and Model.hydrate(). It runs whatever the strict setting, and it applies to top-level and nested paths alike. lean() queries are not affected.

A malicious document can get into the collection in several ways:

  • through a model with strict: false, for example new Model(req.body).save();
  • through another application or the raw MongoDB driver;
  • through any update that writes arbitrary keys.

2. Setting dotted paths: $__set

When it walks a dotted path, $__set read obj[parts[i]] and descended into whatever it found. That included inherited functions, such as Object.prototype.toString on a plain object or Document.prototype.toObject on a subdocument. On subdocuments it also included non-function internals that are prototype getters, such as $__schema, schema, $__middleware and $__schemaTypeOptions. Those point at objects that every document of the model shares.

Attacker-controlled input reaches this path through:

  • A Mixed path on a default, strict schema: new Model({ "mixed.toString.call": 1 }), or doc.set({ "mixed.toString.call": 1 }). Nothing needs to be saved.
  • Any root path on a schema with strict: false: for example doc.set('toString.call', 1).
  • A subdocument with strict: false, when the application passes a user-controlled path to doc.set(path, value): for example doc.set('profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators', []).

3. Merging updates: utils.mergeClone

js
if (typeof to[key] === 'undefined') {
  to[key] = clone(fromObj[key]);
} else if (isObject(val)) {
  mergeClone(to[key], val);   // to[key] may be an inherited built-in
}

to[key] was read without an own-property check, so a key such as toString recursed into Object.prototype.toString. This affects:

  • Model.findOneAndReplace(filter, replacement). It always merges the replacement into the query's update, so a single call with an untrusted replacement is enough.
  • Update calls chained onto a query that already has an update. For example Model.updateOne(filter, { $set: {...} }).updateOne({}, untrustedUpdate), the same pattern with findOneAndUpdate(), or middleware that calls this.updateOne(...).
  • Query.prototype.merge() with a source query whose update came from untrusted input.

Proof of concept

js
const mongoose = require('mongoose');
const { Schema } = mongoose;

// 2. Setting dotted paths: a Mixed path on a default strict schema, nothing saved
const Item = mongoose.model('Item', new Schema({ name: String, meta: {} }));
new Item(JSON.parse('{"meta.toString.call": 1}'));  // e.g. new Item(req.body)
console.log(typeof Object.prototype.toString.call); // 'number'
// From here on, every query in the process fails:
// TypeError: _toString.call is not a function
js
// 1. Loading documents: a stored field named after an Object.prototype method
const Loose = mongoose.model('Loose', new Schema({ name: String }, { strict: false }));
await new Loose(JSON.parse('{"name":"evil","toString":{"call":1}}')).save();
await Loose.findOne({ name: 'evil' });              // any later read of this document
await OtherModel.findOne();                         // TypeError: _toString.call is not a function
js
// 3. Merging updates: a single findOneAndReplace() call with an untrusted replacement
const Doc = mongoose.model('Doc', new Schema({ name: String }));
Doc.findOneAndReplace({}, JSON.parse('{"toString":{"call":1}}'));
console.log(typeof Object.prototype.toString.call); // 'number'
js
// 2. Setting dotted paths: changing the shared subdocument schema
const User = mongoose.model('User', new Schema({
  profile: new Schema({ email: { type: String, required: true } }, { strict: false })
}));
// e.g. JSON-patch style endpoint: doc.set(req.body.path, req.body.value)
new User({ profile: { email: 'a@b.c' } }).set('profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators', []);
await new User({ profile: {} }).validate();         // resolves: `required` removed for every document

Impact

  • Denial of service (paths 1, 2 and 3). One request overwrites Object.prototype.toString.call. After that, every query in the process fails, and so does much other code, until the process restarts. Ways in:

    • new Model(req.body) on any schema with a Mixed path;
    • findOneAndReplace() with an untrusted replacement;
    • reading one stored document that contains a field such as { "toString": { "call": 1 } }.

    In the stored-document case, the attacker does not need any write path through Mongoose at the moment of the attack. Any later read of that document triggers the overwrite. If the document is read on startup or by a scheduled job, the application can be kept down.

  • Changes to shared state (path 2, strict: false subdocuments). An attacker who controls the path passed to doc.set(path, value) can change a subdocument schema that every document shares. For example, they can remove validators or change schema options for every later document in the process.

  • Properties on built-in functions. More generally, an attacker can attach properties they choose to built-in functions such as Object.prototype.toString, Object.prototype.valueOf and Function.prototype.call. Any other code that reads properties of those functions sees the attacker's values.

What to do

Upgrade Mongoose to version 6.13.12, 7.8.13, 8.24.7, 9.11.4, or later.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
npm package mongoose < 6.13.12, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.13, >= 8.0.0, < 8.24.7, >= 9.0.0, < 9.11.4 6.13.12, 7.8.13, 8.24.7, 9.11.4

References

CVSS score 8.2/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-1321
Platform
npm
Package
mongoose
Disclosed
10.11.2026
Updated
12.11.2026 10:00

Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-8332-j7wj-wjw4 - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: mongoose

All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

All (14) in the archive
Total entries
14
First → latest
10.2019 11.2026
Without a fix
0
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • Critical 5
  • High 5
  • Medium 4

Disclosures per year

  1. 2019: 1
  2. 2020: 1
  3. 2021: 0
  4. 2022: 2
  5. 2023: 1
  6. 2024: 1
  7. 2025: 1
  8. 2026: 7
Severity:
  1. Mongoose walks into inherited properties when hydrating, setting, and merging, allowing overwrites of built-in functions (denial of service) and shared schema state this entry
    High · 8.2 CVE-2026-125117 < 6.13.12, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.13, >= 8.0.0, < 8.24.7, >= 9.0.0, < 9.11.4 6.13.12, 7.8.13, 8.24.7, 9.11.4
  2. High · 7.5 CVE-2026-125119 >= 6.0.0, < 6.13.12, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.13, >= 8.0.0, < 8.24.7, >= 9.0.0, < 9.11.4 6.13.12, 7.8.13, 8.24.7, 9.11.4
  3. Critical · 9.8 CVE-2026-125120 < 6.13.11, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.12, >= 8.0.0, < 8.24.3, >= 9.0.0, < 9.9.2 6.13.11, 7.8.12, 8.24.3, 9.9.2
  4. High · 7.5 CVE-2026-42334 < 6.13.9, >= 7.0.0, < 7.8.9, >= 8.0.0, < 8.22.1, >= 9.0.0, < 9.1.6 6.13.9, 7.8.9, 8.22.1, 9.1.6
  5. Critical · 9.0 CVE-2025-23061 >= 8.0.0-rc0, < 8.9.5, >= 7.0.0-rc0, < 7.8.4, < 6.13.6 8.9.5, 7.8.4, 6.13.6
  6. High · 9.8 CVE-2024-53900 >= 8.0.0-rc0, < 8.8.3, >= 7.0.0-rc0, < 7.8.3, >= 6.0.0-rc0, < 6.13.5, >= 3.6.0-rc0, < 5.13.23 8.8.3, 7.8.3, 6.13.5, 5.13.23
  7. Critical · 10.0 CVE-2023-3696 >= 7.0.0, < 7.3.3, >= 6.0.0, < 6.11.3, < 5.13.20 7.3.3, 6.11.3, 5.13.20
  8. Critical · 9.8 CVE-2022-24304 >= 6.0.0, < 6.4.6, < 5.13.15 6.4.6, 5.13.15
  9. High · 7.0 CVE-2022-2564 >= 6.0.0, < 6.4.6, < 5.13.15 6.4.6, 5.13.15
  10. Critical · 9.1 CVE-2019-17426 >= 5.0.0, < 5.7.5, < 4.13.21 5.7.5, 4.13.21

Know which vulnerabilities affect your application

With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.

Connect your application
DockRay newsletter

Application security in your inbox

Important vulnerabilities, actionable guidance and practical advice for your applications. Choose your technologies and follow what matters to your project.

  • A daily digest of new vulnerabilities, critical ones included.
  • Notifications about important updates.
  • Practical advice on application security and monitoring.

Leave empty to receive updates for every technology.

Free to subscribe. Unsubscribe with one click in any email.