better-auth: OAuth Proxy lets an attacker sign in as another user
Am I affected?
You may be affected if you use better-auth from 1.5.0-beta.12 through versions before 1.7.7 with the OAuth Proxy plugin. You are affected only if all of these are also true:
- On a participating environment, the OAuth Proxy plugin has no dedicated
secret, or itssecretequals that environment's global Better Auth secret. - Sign-in state is stored in a cookie (
account.storeStateStrategy: "cookie"). With a database or secondary storage, this is only the case if you chose it explicitly. - Implicit account linking is on (the default).
You are not affected by this path if every participating environment uses a proxy secret distinct from its global Better Auth secret, if sign-in state is stored in the database, or if you use a version before 1.5.0-beta.12.
Summary
The OAuth Proxy plugin trusts any user profile it can decrypt. In the affected setup, Better Auth encrypts sign-in state, including data the caller chose, with the same secret and hands it to anyone who starts a social sign-in. An attacker can use this to get a fake profile for another user's email address that the proxy accepts as real.
Impact
An attacker without an account who knows a user's verified email address can sign in as that user, with that user's permissions. They can read private data, change the account, and link a provider account of their choice to it. They need no provider sign-in and no action from the victim. No availability impact is established, and a reported open redirect was not confirmed.
Patches
The fix is merged for the planned better-auth 1.7.7 release. That package is not available yet.
Upgrade all nodes handling the same cookie-backed OAuth or SAML state flow and all OAuth Proxy participants together, including the production coordinator and preview or development deployments. Keep installed Better Auth packages released alongside better-auth on the same release version. Restart pending sign-in and account-linking flows; pre-upgrade state cookies and proxy payloads are rejected. Public options and API signatures are unchanged.
Workarounds
Until you upgrade to the fixed release, apply one of these:
- Set one strong OAuth Proxy
secretacross every environment that takes part in the proxy flow, and keep it different from each environment's global Better Auth secret. - Set
account.storeStateStrategy: "database". This is already the default when a database or secondary storage is configured. If Magic Link is also enabled, switching can expose a separate cross-purpose verification-record path in affected releases. Ensure the two flows resolve to distinct stored identifiers; with built-in options, use Magic LinkstoreToken: "hashed"with globalverification.storeIdentifierunset or"plain", or disable Magic Link or both built-in social and Generic OAuth sign-in. - Remove the OAuth Proxy plugin if you do not need it.
Setting account.accountLinking.disableImplicitLinking: true stops this path from taking over an existing account. It does not fix the underlying flaw: the callback can still accept attacker-made data as a provider identity. Apply one of the steps above as well.
What to do
Upgrade to better-auth 1.7.7 once available. Update all participating nodes together. Until then, configure a distinct proxy secret, use account.storeStateStrategy: "database", or remove the OAuth Proxy plugin.
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm package | better-auth | >= 1.5.0-beta.12, < 1.7.7 | 1.7.7 |
References
- https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qf
- https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/11494
- https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/ac54bfd67821a7607533af2059858b12bc54e26a
- https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth
- https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.7.7
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-287, CWE-345- Platform
- npm
- Package
better-auth- Disclosed
- 27.10.2026
- Updated
- 31.10.2026 10:00
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qf - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: better-auth
All published vulnerabilities of this package (npm package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 26
- First → latest
- 12.2024 10.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 3
- High 16
- Medium 3
- Low 4
Disclosures per year
- 2024: 1
- 2025: 8
- 2026: 17
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