GPUStack: SAML callback trusts an unverified SAMLResponse, allowing authentication bypass and account takeover
Impact
The callback Base64-decodes the posted XML, reads NameID and attributes, resolves or provisions the user, and mints a gpustack_session JWT — but never calls OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response(), the step that verifies the signature, issuer, audience, destination, and time conditions.
No credentials are required, and SAML SSO does not even need to be configured. The callback processes the payload and issues a session regardless of whether SAML is set up, so every deployment is affected, not only SAML-enabled ones. Anyone who can reach the endpoint over the network can authenticate as an arbitrary identity by posting a response that names it:
- If the name matches an existing user (e.g. an administrator), the attacker receives that user's session — full account takeover, including administrator access.
- Otherwise, a new non-admin user is provisioned.
Administrator access grants full control over the deployment and the infrastructure it manages. Because Response/Assertion IDs are never consumed, a captured signed response also replays indefinitely.
Precondition: network reachability to /auth/saml/callback. SAML SSO configuration is not required. A full proof-of-concept is available privately to maintainers.
Workarounds
There is no effective configuration-level workaround — disabling or not configuring SAML does not mitigate this on affected versions, since the callback runs regardless. Until upgraded, block network access to /auth/saml/callback (e.g. at a reverse proxy / ingress).
Credit
Reported privately by Austin Chu, Sohee Kim, and Corban Villa (UC Berkeley security research project), and independently, earlier, by a researcher who wishes to remain anonymous.
What to do
Upgrade to gpustack 2.2.2 or later:
- The SAML callback now validates the response via
OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response()— signature, issuer, audience, destination, and time conditions — and rejects responses that fail, so forged or replayed assertions are no longer accepted. - The SAML and OIDC login/callback routes are now gated to run only when that provider is the configured active provider, so a deployment that has not enabled the provider no longer parses attacker-supplied IdP payloads.
Until upgraded, block network access to /auth/saml/callback (e.g. at a reverse proxy / ingress).
Affected software
Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.
| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | gpustack | >= 0.7.1, < 2.2.2 | 2.2.2 |
References
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-62m9-f875-rqw6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102894
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5753
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5923
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/705edbe1b5feec63959306daecd640e1c70eced2
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/adc6d82be34e48390720a1361df616e2ea9d6d45
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/releases/tag/v2.2.2
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-294, CWE-347- Platform
- Python (PyPI)
- Package
gpustack- Disclosed
- 10.11.2026
- Updated
- 11.11.2026 10:00
Sources and licenses · Edited or translated by DockRay; source rights and applicable licenses are retained.
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-62m9-f875-rqw6 - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: gpustack
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 2
- First → latest
- 11.2026 11.2026
- Without a fix
- 0
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 1
- High 1
Disclosures per year
- 2026: 2
-
GPUStack: SAML callback trusts an unverified SAMLResponse, allowing authentication bypass and account takeover this entry
Know which vulnerabilities affect your application
With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.