FileGator: Missing authorization in POST /upload allows cross-user read and deletion of temporary files
Summary
POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.
This reproduces the cross-user batch-archive disclosure of GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 through a different route — it still works with the fix for that advisory (PR #597) applied — and additionally allows deleting the login rate-limit lockfile.
Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact, as before: the primitive is confined to the temporary directory, not the whole filesystem.
Details
backend/Controllers/UploadController.php:61—$file_name = $request->input('resumableFilename', 'file')is not passed through thepreg_replace('/[^0-9a-zA-Z_]/', '', ...)that line 66 applies toresumableIdentifier.- Line 88 builds
$prefixnamespaced by the sanitized username, but$file_namereaches the temporary storage at lines 118, 121 and 125 without that prefix. - Line 115 —
if ($chunks_size >= $total_size)is entered wheneverresumableTotalSizeis0. - Lines 116-119 — the assembly loop
for ($i = 1; $i <= $total_chunks; ++$i)does not execute whenresumableTotalChunksis0, so nothing is written to$file_name. - Line 121 —
readStream($file_name)therefore reads the pre-existing temporary file of that exact name. - Line 122 — its contents are stored into the requester's own home directory.
- Line 125 —
remove($file_name)deletes it.
Path traversal outside the temporary directory is prevented by Tmpfs::sanitizeFilename(), so the primitive is bounded to that directory — but every user's transient objects share it.
PoC
Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs. The attacker is a valid low-privileged user holding upload (a first-class permission in the admin UI, and present in the shipped users.json.blank admin set).
- Victim creates a batch archive via
POST /batchdownload; the JSON response returns the archive id. - Attacker sends one
POST /uploadwithresumableFilename=<victim's id>,resumableTotalChunks=0,resumableTotalSize=0,resumableRelativePath=/, and any small valid file part. - Response is
{"data":"Stored"}. The victim's archive is now byte-identical in the attacker's home directory, retrievable through the ordinaryGET /download. The victim's temporary archive has been deleted.
Verified end to end with a PHPUnit test against current master; the archive contents matched byte for byte. Test file available on request.
Impact
Missing authorization (CWE-862) on temporary storage objects.
- Cross-user disclosure of any transient object whose name the attacker can learn or predict. This includes batch archives — so GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4's impact remains reachable even with its fix applied — and the plaintext per-file copies that
ZipArchiver::addFileFromStorage()writes while an archive is being built (those still useuniqid(), which is timestamp-derived). - Arbitrary delete within the temporary directory.
AuthController::login()stores the login rate-limit counter asmd5($ip).'.lock'in that same directory (backend/Controllers/AuthController.php:36, checked at line 44, written at line 58). An attacker can compute their own lockfile name and delete it, defeating the lockout. - Arbitrary append: with
resumableTotalChunks >= 1, line 118write($file_name, ..., true)appends attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary existing temporary file.
Remediation
Do not use the request-supplied filename as a storage key. Namespace the assembly file per user — for example reuse the existing $prefix — and carry the display filename separately for the storage->store() call.
Note that simply applying the [^0-9a-zA-Z_] filter to resumableFilename would corrupt legitimate uploads (sample.txt becomes sampletxt), because $final['filename'] is what becomes the stored name. The fix needs the namespacing, not just the filter.
Software afectado
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| Plataforma | Paquete | Versiones vulnerables | Corregida en |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paquete de Composer | filegator/filegator | < 7.15.0 | 7.15.0 |
Referencias
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/security/advisories/GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94619
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/pull/598
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/commit/cae442a8323fddae7c8cee0924cdbb1aa6eea702
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator
- https://github.com/filegator/filegator/releases/tag/v7.15.0
- Vector CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L- Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-862- Plataforma
- Composer
- Paquete
filegator/filegator- Publicada
- 09.11.2026
- Actualizado
- 10.11.2026 00:17
Fuentes y licencias
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw - CC BY 4.0
Historial de vulnerabilidades: filegator/filegator
Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Paquete de Composer), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.
- Entradas en total
- 4
- Primera → última
- 05.2022 11.2026
- Sin corrección
- 0
- Explotada en ataques
- 0
Distribución por gravedad
- Media 4
Divulgaciones por año
- 2022: 2
- 2023: 0
- 2024: 0
- 2025: 0
- 2026: 2
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