Media

Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern

  • Publicada: 19.11.2026
  • Actualizado: 20.11.2026 00:17

Summary

_extract_from_forwarded_header() (guard_core/utils.py:172-181 in 3.12.0; :179 on master 08780f1) returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without any ipaddress validation. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes client_ip and flows into BehaviorTracker (guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a KEYS glob pattern:

python
key = f"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}"
await self.redis_handler.set_key("behavior_usage", f"{key}:{current_time}", "1", ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f"behavior_usage:{key}:*"
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace

Same shape in track_return_pattern() (behavior_handler.py:135-142). redis_handler.keys() maps to the blocking Redis KEYS command (guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275).

Details

Three consequences, in increasing severity:

  1. Cross-client counter contamination. X-Forwarded-For: * makes the glob match every client's behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client 9.9.9.9 hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying XFF: * issued the pattern behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*, counted the victim's events, and tripped the rule on its first request. An embedded : also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (behavior_handler.py:94-100).
  2. Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans. Each request creates a new unique key (f"{key}:{current_time}") and then issues a blocking KEYS scan whose cost grows with total keys — on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound.
  3. Error path. A tripped ban action passes the non-IP string to ip_ban_manager.ban_ip(), whose ipaddress validation raises ValueError uncaught in the behavioral processor — the request 500s.

PoC

python
import asyncio
from types import SimpleNamespace
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip

class CIHeaders(dict):
    def get(self, key, default=None):
        for k, v in self.items():
            if k.lower() == key.lower():
                return v
        return default

class FakeRequest:
    def __init__(self, xff):
        self.state = SimpleNamespace()
        self.client_host = "10.0.0.1"          # the TRUSTED proxy
        self.headers = CIHeaders({"X-Forwarded-For": xff})

async def main():
    config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=("10.0.0.1",), enable_redis=False)
    ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest("*"), config)
    print(repr(ip))        # -> '*'  (arbitrary string, no validation)

asyncio.run(main())

Then BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage("app.login", "*", rule) issues KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:* — matching other clients' keys (full fake-Redis script: poc_xff_redis.py, available on request).

Impact

Integrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (trusted_proxies defaults empty).

Fix: validate the extracted XFF entry with ipaddress.ip_address() before returning it from extract_client_ip() (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (*?[]) in anything interpolated into a KEYS pattern — or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).

Software afectado

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PlataformaPaqueteVersiones vulnerablesCorregida en
Python (PyPI) guard-core >= 1.0.0, < 3.13.0 3.13.0

Referencias

Puntuación CVSS 5.4/10
Vector CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L
Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-20
Plataforma
Python (PyPI)
Paquete
guard-core
Publicada
19.11.2026
Actualizado
20.11.2026 00:17

Fuentes y licencias

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv - CC BY 4.0

Historial de vulnerabilidades: guard-core

Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Python (PyPI)), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.

Entradas en total
3
Primera → última
11.2026 11.2026
Sin corrección
0
Explotada en ataques
0

Distribución por gravedad

  • Alta 1
  • Media 1
  • Baja 1

Divulgaciones por año

  1. 2026: 3
  1. Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern esta entrada
    Media · 5.4 CVE-2026-129304 >= 1.0.0, < 3.13.0 3.13.0

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