OpenClaw has SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition over ISATAP

Summary

OpenClaw's SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (...:5efe:w.x.y.z). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.

Severity Assessment

Rated medium: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected: >=2026.1.20 <=2026.2.17
• Latest published at patch time: 2026.2.17
• Patched release: 2026.2.19

Security Policy Context

Per SECURITY.md, OpenClaw's web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.

Impact

This can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.

Fix

• Added RFC 5214 ISATAP embedded-IPv4 detection to the shared SSRF classifier.
• Centralized hostname/IP blocking through isBlockedHostnameOrIp and routed relevant validators to that shared path.
• Added regression tests for ISATAP private vs public embedded IPv4 handling.

Fix Commit(s)

• d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8aa

OpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.