Understand vulnerabilities. Protect your applications.
Discover which vulnerabilities affect your technologies and how to fix them. Explore clear explanations, affected versions and practical recommendations - from CMS platforms and plugins to application libraries.
Vulnerability archive 5,032
Reset filtersNuxt: URL-handling weaknesses in `navigateTo` and `reloadNuxtApp`: SSR open redirect, client-side script execution via the `open` option, and protocol-relative bypass in `reloadNuxtApp`
YouTransfer has an issue in the sendmail transport integration that allows arbitrary code execution
Remotion: arbitrary file write vulnerability
Remotion: remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability
Nuxt: Dev server discloses project absolute path and persistent workspace UUID via `/.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json`
aws-cdk-lib: OS Command Injection in NodejsFunction Bundling
markdown-it: Quadratic complexity DoS in smartquotes rule via replaceAt string operations
OpenTelemetry Core: Unbounded memory allocation in W3C Baggage propagation
Nest: Middleware Bypass on Fastify via Trailing Slash
Electron: Buffer performs incorrect byte length calculations resulting in heap buffer under/overflow
UAParser.js: Unbounded `Sec-CH-UA-Model` parsing can trigger ReDoS in `withClientHints()`
protobufjs-cli: Code injection in pbjs static output from crafted JSON descriptor names
protobufjs: Memory amplification from preserved unknown fields in binary decode
DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives `clearConfig()` and can poison later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output
React Router: Potential CSRF via PUT/PATCH/DELETE document requests
Vitest Browser: Exposed Browser Mode API Can Proxy CDP and Overwrite Config Files, Leading to RCE
DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside <template> content when using DOM output modes
DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside <template>.content
DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects
DOMPurify: Hook mutation of `data.allowedTags` / `data.allowedAttributes` permanently pollutes `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS` / `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR`
DOMPurify: Cross-realm IN_PLACE sanitization leaves executable markup intact via realm-bound `instanceof` checks
DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM
Nodemailer: CRLF injection in Nodemailer List-* header comments allows arbitrary message header injection
Know which vulnerabilities affect your application
With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.