Medium

AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect in Image Download Endpoints

  • Disclosed: 26.03.2026
  • Updated: 11.10.2026 10:22

Summary

isSSRFSafeURL() validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but url_get_contents() follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.

Root Cause

Check-time: isSSRFSafeURL() at objects/functions.php:4066 resolves the hostname and validates the IP.

Use-time: url_get_contents() at objects/functions.php:1990 calls file_get_contents() with PHP's default follow_location=1 — redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.

Affected endpoint: objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:

php
if (isValidURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']) && isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image'])) {
    $content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']);

Proof of Concept

  1. Attacker sets up https://attacker.com/redir to respond with 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
  2. Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:
GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&...
  1. isSSRFSafeURL() resolves attacker.com → public IP → passes validation
  2. url_get_contents() follows 302 redirect to 169.254.169.254 → SSRF

Impact

  • Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
  • Internal network service access
  • Bypasses the existing SSRF protection that was added to prevent exactly this class of attack

Note

The curl path in url_get_contents() does NOT set CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION so it is not affected. Only the file_get_contents and wget fallback paths are vulnerable.

Suggested Fix

Set follow_location to 0 in the stream context and handle redirects manually with re-validation, or add isSSRFSafeURL() check inside url_get_contents() after resolving the final URL.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Composer package wwbn/avideo <= 26.0 no fix

References

CVSS score -
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-918
Platform
Composer
Package
wwbn/avideo
Disclosed
26.03.2026
Updated
11.10.2026 10:22

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-f359-r3pv-2phf - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: wwbn/avideo

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Composer package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

All (160) in the archive
Total entries
160
First → latest
04.2022 06.2026
Without a fix
143
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • Critical 14
  • High 61
  • Medium 83
  • Low 2

Disclosures per year

  1. 2022: 2
  2. 2023: 5
  3. 2024: 5
  4. 2025: 0
  5. 2026: 148
Severity:
  1. High · 9.8 CVE-2026-41304 <= 29.0 no fix
  2. Critical CVE-2026-33867 <= 26.0 no fix
  3. AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect in Image Download Endpoints this entry
    Medium CVE-2026-33766 <= 26.0 no fix
Show more (20) Showing 40 of 76

Know which vulnerabilities affect your application

With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.

Connect your application
DockRay newsletter

Application security in your inbox

Important vulnerabilities, actionable guidance and practical advice for your applications. Choose your technologies and follow what matters to your project.

  • A daily digest of new vulnerabilities, critical ones included.
  • Notifications about important updates.
  • Practical advice on application security and monitoring.

Leave empty to receive updates for every technology.

Free to subscribe. Unsubscribe with one click in any email.