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Wyczyść filtryNuxt: URL-handling weaknesses in `navigateTo` and `reloadNuxtApp`: SSR open redirect, client-side script execution via the `open` option, and protocol-relative bypass in `reloadNuxtApp`
YouTransfer has an issue in the sendmail transport integration that allows arbitrary code execution
Remotion: arbitrary file write vulnerability
Remotion: remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability
Nuxt: Dev server discloses project absolute path and persistent workspace UUID via `/.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json`
aws-cdk-lib: OS Command Injection in NodejsFunction Bundling
markdown-it: Quadratic complexity DoS in smartquotes rule via replaceAt string operations
OpenTelemetry Core: Unbounded memory allocation in W3C Baggage propagation
Nest: Middleware Bypass on Fastify via Trailing Slash
Electron: Buffer performs incorrect byte length calculations resulting in heap buffer under/overflow
UAParser.js: Unbounded `Sec-CH-UA-Model` parsing can trigger ReDoS in `withClientHints()`
protobufjs-cli: Code injection in pbjs static output from crafted JSON descriptor names
protobufjs: Memory amplification from preserved unknown fields in binary decode
DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives `clearConfig()` and can poison later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output
React Router: Potential CSRF via PUT/PATCH/DELETE document requests
Vitest Browser: Exposed Browser Mode API Can Proxy CDP and Overwrite Config Files, Leading to RCE
DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside <template> content when using DOM output modes
DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside <template>.content
DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects
DOMPurify: Hook mutation of `data.allowedTags` / `data.allowedAttributes` permanently pollutes `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS` / `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR`
DOMPurify: Cross-realm IN_PLACE sanitization leaves executable markup intact via realm-bound `instanceof` checks
DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM
Nodemailer: CRLF injection in Nodemailer List-* header comments allows arbitrary message header injection
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