OpenClaw vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via attacker-controlled setup-api.js loaded from cwd during env-key resolution

Summary

OpenClaw's bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to process.cwd() while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.

Impact

This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw on npm
• Affected: versions before 2026.4.23
• Fixed: 2026.4.23
• Latest stable verified fixed: openclaw@2026.4.23, tag v2026.4.23

Fix

OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes process.cwd() as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js is not loaded through provider setup resolution.

Fix Commit(s)

• 993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707 (fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback)

Severity

Severity remains high because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user running OpenClaw. The CVSS vector is local/user-interaction scoped rather than network-only because the victim must run OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled directory.